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INTRODUCTION

On October 20, 1988, the president of RJR Nabisco announced the
"biggest deal ever": he was, he said, "considering" taking his firm private in a $17.6 billion leveraged buyout. That day, the price of RJR
Nabisco stock jumped $21.38, to $77.25.1 However, even as the news
about RJR Nabisco buoyed the stock market with prospects of easy
money, it caused jitters in the bond market. Reynolds's bonds plummeted; some fell as much as 20 points, or $200 per $1000 face value. 2
Fear that the RJR deal heralded a wave of similar transactions caused a
near halt to trading in high grade corporate bonds and prompted a
"flight to quality" by bothd investors. 3
The RJR Nabisco announcement and these market reactions are
emblematic of debt-equity relations in this time of corporate restructuring. The RJR Nabisco buyout illustrates a pattern: restructuring firms
borrow, they remit the proceeds to their equityholders, and the increased
leverage injures their existing debtholders. In effect, these transactions
1. RJR Nabisco ChiefConsideringBuy-Out of Concernfor $)7.6 Billion, or $75 a Share, Wall
St. J., Oct. 21, 1988, at A3, col. 1. This announcement marked the beginning of the largest takeover
battle in history. Rival bids succeeded one another until Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Company
claimed victory on November 30, 1988, with a bid of $24.88 billion, or $109 per share. History of the
RJR Takeover, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1988, at D15, col. 3.
2. Winkler, Wall Street is Devising the Takeover-ProofBond,Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1988, at CI,
col. 3; see also Gilpin, Bid for RJR Nabisco Jolts Bonds, N.Y. Tunes, Oct. 21, 1988, at DI1, col. 1.
3. Wallace, Buyouts DevastatingBondholders N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1988, at Dl, col. 3. Investors fled to the bonds of issuers unlikely to be involved in restructuring transactions-utilities and
European corporations. Herman & Stine, Bonds Stage Rebound amid Declining Oil Prices and a
Hint That the Fed Isn't Tightening Credit, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1988, at C21, col. 1.
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transfer wealth from injured debt to benefited equity. 4
Many examples of restructuring-related injury preceded RJR
Nabisco, but it took the RJR Nabisco shock to goad players in the bond
markets into open combat. Before RJR Nabisco, bondholders complained about wealth transfers but did not act; they merely reshuffled
their portfolios again and again as waves of restructuring upset their expectations. Despite repeated injury, they did not negotiate effective protection in the next generation of debt contracts. 5 Nor did they pursue the
matter in court.6 With RJR Nabisco the pattern changed. Market actors drafted and publicized contract provisions that effectively protected
bondholders from restructuring-related wealth transfers.7 Finally, a major institutional debtholder filed a lawsuit.8 But it remains to be seen
whether these nascent challenges can break the pattern of injury.
The challengers have an uphill battle. Before RJR Nabisco, bondholders' case against restructuring injury looked closed; indeed, it had
never been opened. The issue had been settled at the level of business
practice; that settlement probably will persist. The investment and management communities have acknowledged no bondholder rights in the
structure of their legal relationships-at least no rights that would interfere with restructurings. Investors and managers have left bondholders
to take their chances with restructuring, just as they take their chances
with mismanagement, inflation, and recession. Yet, no impairment of
bonds as a financing vehicle seems to have resulted. New corporate debt
financing proceeds apace. Restructurings have pushed corporate debtequity ratios to historic highs; 9 levels of indebtedness formerly thought
unacceptably risky have become routine.
As this picture'emerges, lawmakers stand by, acquiescing silently.
Yet nothing in legal theory dictates that they do so. In evaluating wealth
transfers, lawmakers can draw on two competing legal norms, selfprotection and legal protection. By choosing the latter norm, they can
intervene to impose a bondholder-protective duty, supported by ample
4. For a more complete description of this phenomenon, see infra text accompanying notes
188-204.
5. See infra notes 269-79 and accompanying text.

6. No judicial opinion squarely ruling on the wealth transfers has appeared.
7. See infra notes 280-84 and accompanying text.
8. The plaintiff is the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. According to Metropolitan's
chairman, John Creedon, "It's time somebody blew the whistle .... " Wallace, A Bruising Battle
over Bonds, N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 27, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 2, col. 3; see also Farrell, Miller & Zigas,
BondholdersAre Mad as Hell--and No Wonder, Bus. WK., Dec. 5, 1988, at 28 (lack of protection
from covenants has driven aggrieved bondholders, including Metropolitan, into court).
9. See infra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
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caselaw and commentary. 10 Furthermore, debt-equity ratios have been
regulated in the past.11
Disposition at the level of business practice is a singular treatment
for the multi-billion-dollar issue of investor protection posed by the restructuring-related wealth transfers. Yet, this approach shows every
likelihood of persisting, despite questions raised in the wake of the RJR
Nabisco restructuring. This Article endeavors to explain this treatment
of restructuring injury by applying a relational1 2 theory of corporate
debt-equity relations.
This relational theory's foundation is the assertion that corporate
debt relationships do not have clearly defined, objective meanings. Complex debtor-creditor relationships give rise to interpretive contingencies.
Different observers offer different interpretations; these interpretations
shape different conceptions of the relationship, both positive and normative. This Article identifies, distinguishes, and discusses three such interpretive conceptions, which compete in contemporary corporate law and
business practice. The first, the "traditional" conception, applies the relational assumptions underlying traditional debtor-creditor law. The second, the "investment" conception, views creditors as investors in
corporate borrowers and applies the ideology of investor protection. The
third, the "agency" conception, views debt as a traded security and applies the assumptions of financial economics.
No one 6f the three conceptions, taken alone, captures the corporate
debt relationship's "essence." Despite this, lawmakers and commentators dealing with debt issues always apply one of the three conceptions to
the others' exclusion, assuming that the chosen conception "is the case."
By choosing a conception, they interpret, albeit inadvertently. In inter10. For an exposition of the case for a fiduciary duty for bondholders, see McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders; 13 J. CoRP. L. 205, 265-312 (1988) [hereinafter McDaniel, BondholdersII];
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 442-50 (1986) [hereinafter
McDaniel, BondholdersI]. For an exposition of the case for a bondholder-protective duty of good
faith under contract law, see Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudenceof Convertible Bonds 1984
Wis. L. Rnv. 667, 691-98 [hereinafter Bratton, Convertible Bonds]; Bratton, The Interpretation of
Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, 5 CARDoZO L REv. 371 (1984) [hereinafter
Bratton, Interpretation].
11. See infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.

12. Ian Macneil's relational contract theory is a principal influence. See I. MACNEiL, THE
NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONs (1980); Mac-

neil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to ProfessorsLindenberg and de Vos 143 J.
INST'L & THEORETICAL ECON. 272 (1987); Macneil, Values in Contract" Internal andExterna4 78

Nw. U.L. REv. 340 (1983); Macneil, Economic Analysis ofContractualRelation" Its Shortfalls and
the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus;" 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1018 (1981). I elaborate a
broader application of relational contract principles in Bratton, The "Nexusof Contracts" Corporation: A CriticalAppraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. - (forthcoming, 1989) [hereinafter Bratton, Nexus
of ContractsAppraisal].
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preting, they also adopt a normative approach. Norms influence and follow from the inadvertent interpretations, without acknowledgment.
Deceivingly clear answers result Failure to recognize the underlying interpretations prevents recognition of the weakness of the norms applied.
The Article, having identified these competing conceptions, demonstrates their influence on choices between the competing norms of selfprotection and creditor protection. Lawmakers synchronize 3 the norms
by applying the conceptions; in turn, the evolving relational practices of
the securities markets and corporate institutions shape and reshape the
conceptions. A bondholder-protective right lies inchoate in the corporate debt relationship, no matter how interpreted. This right, although
rarely determinative of legal rulings, persists as a critical supplement in a
predominantly self-protective normative regime.
This framework shows us that the law tolerates restructuringrelated wealth transfers without giving them normative approbation.
This tolerance derives from respect for market actors' relational practices-a respect that intensifies as the figure of the unprotected small investor takes a smaller place in conceptions of corporate relationships.
But the tolerance is conditional; it could yield to changes in the relational
picture. A similar, but more watchful and skeptical tolerance greets the
new debt-equity ratios.
The Article has two parts. Part I identifies the interpretive contingencies in the law of corporate debt. It describes and discusses the three
competing conceptions and shows that norms of self-protection and creditor protection vary in intensity according to the conception being applied.1 4 Part II applies this relational framework to restructuringrelated wealth transfers and the new debt-equity ratios. It details the role
that the three conceptions play in the legal and business communities'
responses to these developments.1 5 The Article concludes that restructuring-related wealth transfers and high debt pass normative inspection
against today's relational background, but that an element of interpretive
contingency persists.16 The discussion shows that recognizing the contingency in the law does not impair the day-to-day practices of capital
raising. Rather, this recognition enhances the law's ethical integrity.
13. For discussions of the jurisprudential significance of synchronization, see Cornell, Institutionalization ofMeaning, Recollective Imaginationand the Potentialfor TransformativeLegal Interpretatdon 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1210-12 (1988); Cornell, From the Lighthouse: The Promise of
Redemption and the Possibility of Legal Interpretation, in LEGAL HERmENEuiics (G. Leyh ed.,
forthcoming, 1989).
14. See infra notes 17-185 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 220-55, 269-88, and.accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 220-55, 341-46, and accompanying text.
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THREE CONCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE DEBT-EQUITY
RELATIONSHIPS

Debtors and creditors make a simple exchange. The creditor advances funds and receives a promise to repay with interest. Sometimes,
however, this simple beginning leads to a complex relationship, particularly with large, long-term loans to major producing institutions such as
"management corporations." 17 In these cases, the creditor can be another corporation, a single financial institution, a group of financial institutions, or a group of widely dispersed individuals and financial
institutions. Relationships between management corporations and these
large institutional lenders and bondholders are ongoing and complex.
The easily grasped, objective meaning of the simple loan and promise to
pay does not fully describe them. Nor do the concepts of "debtor" and
"creditor" tell us everything about what these relationships mean to the
participants. To understand these relationships adequately, we must
look more closely at the parties and forward into time beyond the moment of promise.
Observers differ in their renderings of these complex debtor-creditor
relationships. Different institutional perspectives influence these renderings. Today, three such interpretive conceptions-traditional, investment, and agency-shape corporate debtor-creditor law. This part of the
Article describes these conceptions, their competitive coexistence, and
their respective roles in legal doctrine and theory. Normative contradiction pervades this story. Norms of self-protection and creditor protection compete within and among the three conceptions. Overall, selfprotection prevails, but never so fully as to become automatic or to obviate the ethical awkwardness of withholding legal protection from injured
creditors. Thus, normative contradiction persists. But, as the story
shows, the contradiction is wholesome.
A.

Overview

1. The TraditionalConception. The "traditional" conception incorporates a simple model of the debt exchange. It imposes this model
on complex corporate debtor-creditor relationships, shaping them to
make them fit.
The simple model has roots in pre-industrial history. It treats debt
as an exchange between flesh-and-blood individuals. As an example, im17. A management corporation is a mass-producing corporation or other large corporate entity
with widely held shares. See infra text accompanying note 51. This Article employs this term in
preference to the usual term, "public corporation."
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agine a small-town banker who makes a loan to a local farmer.' Debtor
and creditor are personally acquainted and personally involved in the
debt relationship. But they fear and suspect one another; no significant
trust develops. In adversity, the banker will too readily foreclose. The
farmer, meanwhile, will too readily frustrate the banker by hiding or
otherwise disposing of his property. Such opportunism, coming from
either side, will enrage the injured party. The law intervenes to prevent
violence and generally to protect the mode of exchange from the participants' self-protective instincts. Legal rules responsive to this conception
have shaped debtor-creditor doctrine throughout its history. They still
dominate it now.
2.- The Investment Conception. The "investment" conception has
a very different archetype. Here the basic transaction is a publicly offered corporate bond issue with a long term-Mfifteen, twenty, or thirty
years. The traditional picture of debtor and creditor as personal enemies
does not accurately describe this transaction. With corporate bonds, no
person-to-person encounters need occur.' 9 The debtor is a management
corporation that issues a security, not an individual who signs a note.
The creditor, whether an institution or an individual, sees itself more as a
securityholder than as an adverse lender. Relationships between issuers
and securityholders tend to be depersonalized and objectified. Thus, the
personal involvement and subjective responses of traditional, individual
debtors and creditors do not shape "investments" in debt.
Managerialist theories of the corporation influence the investment
conception. 2° Managerialism posits separation of stockholders' ownership and managers' control with concomitant stockholder passivity. Applied to bonds, it depicts the creditor as simply another investor outside
the managerial power structure. In this model, the creditor has as much
in common with a stockholder as it has with a traditional individual
18. This creditor's literary archetype is Shakespeare's Shylock, as Morey McDaniel has recently noted. See McDaniel, Bondholders II, supra note 10, at 258 & n.439; see also W. SHAKEssEARt, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act I, sc. 3, 1140-50, act IV, sc. 1, 11. 184-310 (D. Bevington
3d ed. 1980). For a philosophical construction of the traditional creditor and debtor, see F. NiETzscHE, THE GENT-ALOGY OF MORALS 70-82 (H. Samuel trans. 1924).
19. Some cases of corporate debt as investment do involve extensive personal relationships.
Heavily negotiated bank loans and private placements are based on business relationships between
managers of debtors and creditors. But even these relationships lack the intensity of the traditional
debtor-creditor relationship. Since the individuals who negotiate bank loans and private placements
act on behalf of institutional employers, they tend to limit their personal identification with any

particular transaction.
20. For a description of the managerialist theory of the firm, see Bratton, Nexus of Contracts
Appralsal supra note 12.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1989:92

lender, and perhaps more. The creditor joins a common enterprise with
the managers and stockholders; cooperative spirit enters the relationship.
These cooperative norms coexist uneasily with the relationships' adverse elements. The paradigm of investor protection seems to apply, because the bondholder is a powerless individual who relies on corporate
management. But the relationship also has a basis in a negotiated contract, so the paradigm of individual self-protection, and even the norms
of the traditional debtor-creditor relationship, also seem to apply. Corporate debtor-creditor law mediates this normative conflict.
3. The Agency Conception. The "agency" conception of corporate debtors and creditors comes from financial economics. It now informs, even dominates, academic writing but as yet only slightly
influences lawmaking.
Under the agency conception, the neoclassical microeconomic
model of production by firms determines the interpretive gloss applied to
loan transactions. Rational, profit-maximizing microeconomic actors
populate this model. 21 Conflicts of interest and self-protection by contract are presumed. As under the investment conception, debt resembles
stock, and the lender holds a depersonalized security. But here the
lender stands ready to trade that security at a moment's notice in a perfect trading market. The model transforms the investment conception's
long-term, cooperative loan into a fully objectified investment in a diversified portfolio of securities. With this full "securitization," time horizons shorten, and possibilities for investor self-protection expand. The
corporate borrower's institutional and managerialist characteristics lose
their normative relevance. The normative question becomes whether any
legal regulation should shape the contracting parties' behavior.
4. Normative Contradiction& The three conceptions interact to
form a larger legal picture. A norm of creditor self-protection informs all
three conceptions, dominating the traditional and agency conceptions
but merely supplementing the investment conception. This norm also
dominates corporate debtor-creditor doctrine-in most cases, it determines the result. Yet it does not stand alone; a countervailing,
creditorprotective norm almost always accompanies it. This creditor-protective
norm plays a supplementary role in the traditional and agency conceptions as well as in legal doctrine, rarely determining results. It tends to
play a determinative role only in academic renditions of the investment
22
conception.
21. See K. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (3d ed. 1986).
22. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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The uneasy, imbalanced coexistence of these two norms follows
from and reflects relational practices. Long-term corporate debt inevitably entails relational complication. Parties in practice strive to minimize
this complication. They structure their relationship to stay as much at
arm's length as possible, using trust indentures, loan agreements, and
other formidable documents. But they never fully succeed at transforming their debt relationships into discrete contracts. Even so, the law respects their attempts and applies the self-protective norm. If it did not, it
would fail to uphold the values that parties bring to their relationships.
Normative contradiction enters in because, at the same time, lawmakers
strive to accord full respect to the individuals involved in particular relationships, recognizing that, despite the prevalence of institutions, corporate debt-equity relationships ultimately involve real people. Legal
norms recognize that these people are fallible. This leads decisionmakers
to seek to offer such people protection, despite the fact that, viewed overall, the contracting process is oriented toward self-protection.
The self-protective element dominates the pattern of real world corporate debtor-creditor relationships. Faithful to these relationships, the
law follows suit, privileging self-protection over creditor-protective legal
intervention. But self-protection never becomes a doctrinal absolute,
even as it tends to trump protective intervention in practice.
B.

The TraditionalConception-CorporateDebt as Individual Debt

Corporate debtor-creditor doctrine, a subpart of corporale law, integrates basic principles of debtor-creditor law and the traditional legal
model of the corporation. The traditional conception informs both of
these doctrinal sources. Debtor-creditor law draws a line between traditionally conceived debtors and creditors. It mediates their adverse interests, protecting the solvent debtor from creditor interference and
protecting the insolvent debtor's creditor from debtor misconduct. Corporate law's structural model assigns debt a fixed place: equity owns the
corporation; corporate debt is a contractual relationship between the
creditor and the corporation. The traditional mold casts this "contractual" creditor as an adverse party.
The doctrine of corporate creditors' rights, thus constituted,
strongly reflects the norm of self-protection. It substantially constrains
the legal protection of corporate creditors. Nevertheless, it has always
carried an internal relational modification and has recognized creditor
protection as a legitimate legal concern. Creditor protection has thus
had a persistent, supplementing influence on corporate doctrine.
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1. DoctrinalModels of the CorporateDebtor-CreditorRelationship.

a. Debtor-creditor law and the mediation of conflicta Debtorcreditor law mediates between debtors and creditors, defining zones of
protected interest on each side and imposing protective rules. The

debtor's interest is in autonomy-the freedom to manage his assets without creditor interference.2 3 This interest controls the relationship until
the debtor becomes or is about to become insolvent. The law recognizes
no impairment of a creditor's interest prior to a debtor's insolvency because, by definition, the debtor can still repay the loan. The balance

shifts only when default becomes a certainty or a near-certainty. 24 Of
course, debtors who mismanage property can inflict substantial damage
on creditors well before insolvency, particularly when repayment depends on a going concern's cash flow. Nevertheless, the law holds to the

policy of nonintervention. At the same time, however, it facilitates creditor control by enforcing their efforts to constrain debtor conduct by
contract.

25

Upon a debtor's insolvency, the creditors' interests prevail and the
law imposes creditor-protective duties. The insolvent debtor's estate is
administered for the creditors' benefit. 26 And, at or near the point of
insolvency, the law defines and prohibits debtor actions that injure creditors.2 7 In the corporate context, these rules tend to be characterized as
"fiduciary. ' 28 But that characterization does not extend their creditor-

protective reach.
23. Carlson, Leveraged Buyouis in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REv. 73, 77 (1985).
24. Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 10, at 733.
25. Interestingly, in pre-industrial times, the policy of nonintervention prior to insolvency had
predominantly a creditor-protective effect. Long-term lending occurred only when secured by real
estate, and a debtor's mismanagement could do little permanent damage to the value of real property. No compelling reason for creditor intervention in debtor management existed. I A. DEWING,
THE FINANCiAL POLICY OF CORPORAMONS 189 n.kk (5th ed. 1953).
26. 1 id at 190 n.oo. No legal occasion for collective action by creditors arises prior to insolvency. But once the debtor is insolvent, payment of one claim necessarily prejudices other creditors.
The law imposes the bankruptcy system in part to provide creditors with a collective means of
solving this preferential payment problem. McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An
Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L. REV. 249, 259-60 (1981).
27. This duty of creditor protection appears most noticeably in fraudulent conveyance law.
Carlson, supra note 23, at 77-78.
28. For a classic statement of the corporate debtor-creditor norm, see A. BERLE, STUDIES IN
THE LAW OF CORPORATION FiNANcE 157 n.3 (1928). According to Berle, a creditor has no standing to complain of a debtor corporation's management unless the debtor is insolvent, the debtor
proposes a course of business that endangers its solvency, or its management deliberately attempts to
defraud complaining creditors. Berle notes that "[u]nder the stress of circumstances . . . some
courts have held that a corporate management has certain fiduciary obligations toward creditors...
[but] that each case turns on its facts." Id; see also I A. DEWING, supra note 25, at 190 n.oo (courts
will intervene to give creditors relief if there is implication of fraud or if creditors can show that
debtor corporation is actually insolvent).
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b. Debt and equity in the legal model of the corporation Corporate law associates equity interests with risk, control, and ownership; it
leaves debt out of this association. This conception draws on classical
economic theory, which modeled economic life in terms of production by
individual producers and transactions between individuals, each bearing
responsibility for his or her own actions. In the nineteenth century, corporate doctrine adapted this individual conception to group production,
reconstructing the classical individual's entrepreneurial behavior pattern
within the corporate structure.29 Under this view, the entrepreneurial
mantle-the role of "adventurer" 3C--falls on the stockholder, conceived
as an owner-manager. 3 1 Among the corporate claimants, the stockholder faces the highest risk of loss and enjoys the highest potential for
gain. As the "natural" concomitant of this extreme risk-return situation,
32
a right to control accompanies ownership.
Under this model, creditors join the firm not as "owners" or "members," but as contractual suppliers of capital. The relationship is contractual in more than one sense. The exchange of money for a promise to
pay at interest and the document recording that exchange are both "contracts." "Contract" also designates relational status: creditors, being
"contractually" tied to the firm, are not members of the firm entity. An
additional "contract," the paradigmatic bargain between the creditors
and the corporation, justifies this status. The creditors trade incidents of
ownership, like control and profit, first, for periodic payments made
without regard to profit, and, second, for repayment of principal at a
fixed date, with priority over the equityholders' claims to the corporaFor an updated statement of the debtor-creditor norm, recast in the contractualist terms of the
law and economics movement, see Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper
Domain, 38 VAND. L REV. 829, 836-37 (1985) (debtor-creditor law should constrain transactions
that affect third parties and should establish preformulated provisions that parties would contract for
anyway).

29. See Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: CriticalPerspectiesfrom History, 41
(forthcoming, 1989) [hereinafter Bratton, HistoricalPerspectives].
STAN. L REv. 30. See the classic tax case enunciating this debt-equity distinction, Commissioner v. O.P.P.
Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935):
The stockholder is an adventurer in the corporate business; he takes the risk, and profits
from success. The creditor, in compensation for not sharing the profits, is to be paid independently of the risk of success, and gets a right to dip into the capital when the payment
date arrives.
31. The crisis for classical microeconomic thinking came in the late nineteenth century when
the owner-entrepreneurs of large manufacturing corporations became passive, outside investors, and
non-owner managers took control. See Bratton, HistoricalPerspectives supra note 29, for a discussion of the role that this theoretical problem played in the evolution of corporate legal theory.
32. See Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints 91 YALE
Li. 1521, 1526-27 (1982).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1989:92

tion's assets. 33 This paradigm contract, in effect, interprets the basic
debtor-creditor exchange to exclude incidents of corporate ownership.
This contractual conception of creditor participation still determines
the basic models of corporate law, tax law, and accounting. Thus, today's sfockholders elect boards of directors and take the benefit of corporate law's directive that managers enhance "corporate profit and
stockholder gain." Together the managers and stockholders are the
"debtor"--"corporate profit" does not include "creditor gain." Payments to creditors are a business cost like labor and materials; they generate tax deductions3 5 and reduce earnings for accounting purposes. 36 In
contrast, periodic payments to stockholders come from "corporate
37
profit" and are not treated as costs.
This model of corporate structure, with its origins in the nineteenthcentury conception of an owner-managed firm, rests on an alignment of
managers' and stockholders' economic interests. 38 But in practice, of
course, the interests of nonstockholder managers diverge from those of
widely dispersed stockholder "owners." To keep managers' actions consistent with stockholders' interests, corporate law imposes fiduciary duties on managers. Creditors, limited to contractual participation, are not
beneficiaries of these duties. Traditional notions of debtor-creditor adversity, as well as the structure of risk allocation among corporate claimants, justify this treatment. Creditors' and stockholders' interests conflict
in investment decisions; stockholders prefer more risk than do credi33. CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING PROJECT, AM. BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON MODEL
DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS 1-2 (1971) [hereinafter ABF COMMENTARIES].
34. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF CORPORATIONS].
35. L.C. § 163(a) (West 1988). Apparently, this tax treatment is so intuitively appealing that
Congress has never bothered to explain it. Comment, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 118, 122 n.23 (1985). For a case offering an
explanation, see Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1935).
36. But cf Anthony, Accounting Rates of Return." Note, AM. ECON. REV., Mar. 1986, at 245
("[Alccountants do not recognize [the cost of the use of equity capital] in calculating a company's
income.").
37. These regimes, while committed to the idea that debt and equity are essentially different,
are less than successful in distinguishing them at the margin. Convertible bonds and other hybrid
instruments present particularly intractable problems for the tax system. One commentator identified 38 factors that courts have considered in classifying interests as debt or equity. See Holzman,
The Interest-DividendGuidelines, 47 TAXES 4 (1969). An attempt to formulate clear-cut regulations
under congressional mandate, see I.R.C. § 385, ended in failure. See Comment, supra note 35, at
118-19. The accounting profession has had more success with its bright-line rules. See, eg., EARNINGS PER SHARE, Accounting Practices Bd. Op. No. 15, §§ 15, 31 (1969) (convertible bonds treated
as equity for purposes of earnings reports).
38. B. MANNING, LEGAL CAPITAL 12 (2d ed. 1981).
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tors. 39 As a result, management cannot look to the interests of both; its
legal duties extend only to the more vulnerable group, the stockholders. 4°
Corporate legal theory, once again invoking "contract," and echoing the traditional conception, remits creditors to self-protection regarding a firm's investment decisions. This treatment extends to related

interests as well. 41 In practice, corporate creditors accept the directive

and respond with an array of contract protections. For example, they

employ the ancient device of the lien on debtor property. They also impose covenants not to injure the creditors' interests. 42
39. Jensen & Meckling Theory of the Fnn: ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costsand Ownership'
Strctur, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334-35 (1976).
40. See REsTATEmENT OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 34, § 5.04 n.12 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1986), R. CLAM CORPORATE LAW 17-18 (1986) (managers have duty to maximize shares' value).
The ALI remits creditors to the laws of creditors' rights and bankruptcy and to contract-based
protection. Following this reasoning, the ALI also denies crpditors derivative standing, subject to an
exception for convertible bondholders whose interests fairly and adequately represent those of a
corporation's equityholders. RESTATEMENT OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 34, § 7.02 comment b
(rent. Draft No. 1, 1982).
41. For example, creditors have a related, similarly risk-averse interest in the maintenance of a
substantial block of corporate assets unencumbered by prior or competing claims. See B. MANNING,
supra note 38, at 6-7 (discussing creditors' interests in traditional terms).
42. These "business covenants" constrain, inter alia, management discretion to incur additional
debt, to encumber property, and to make distributions to stockholders. For further discussion, see
infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
None of the incidents of the corporate debtor-creditor model, it bears noting, are absolute.
Parties can vary many of them by contract, at least in theory. For example, a guaranty can negate
stockholders' limited liability. Creditors may contract for unusual powers-indeed, in Delaware
they may obtain formal voting rights. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221 (Supp. 1988). Even residual
risk-bearing can be modified by contract. Corporate law requires the disbursement of the proceeds
of the winding up of a business. But the law also respects creditors' subordination agreements
among creditors, which modify the distribution of such proceeds. Theoretically, creditors could
even contract to remit all or part of such proceeds to the stockholders.
In effect, then, the law's debtor-creditor model fits the characterization used in the law and
economics literature: it provides "off-the-rack" contract terms-nonmandatory provisions available
to producing parties at low cost, but subject to variation. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 28, at
835-36-n.21. Little follows from this particular insight into the "contractual" nature of the corporation, however. The law contains disincentives that deter parties from exploring contractual alternatives to the received debtor-creditor model. Creditors can share in control in theory, but in practice
they do not, because the law does not give them the privilege of limited liability. If they assume
control, they assume personal liability for any mismanagement and injury that they inflict in the
conduct of business. See Bartlett & l.patin, The Status of a Creditoras a "Controlling Person," 28
MERcER L REv. 639, 662 (1977) (putting question of "control" at crux of debt-equity risk-return
relationship-whether creditor abandons customary role of obtaining security for payment and attempts to reap direct benefit from corporation's investments); see also Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor
Liabilities Resultingfrom Improper Intererence with the Management of a Financially Troubled
Debtor,31 Bus. LAW. 343, 365 (1975) (to avoid potential liability, creditors should exercise extreme
care in controlling debtors); Lundgren, Liability of a Creditorin a Control Relationship with its
Debtor, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 523, 523-25 (1984) (when creditor exercises substantial control (as measured by different tests) over debtor's business affairs, creditor becomes potentially liable for the
debtor's debts). There is no completely effective way to avoid this segment of the model. Creditor
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2. Creditor-Protective Supplements. The doctrinal combination
of the debtor-creditor mediation and creditors' contractual status makes
legal intervention to benefit creditor interests a very unlikely proposition,
outside of bankruptcy. But, for two reasons, the law does not absolutely
exclude pre-insolvency protection for creditors.
First, there is historical precedent for creditor protection. Corporate law limited creditor protection only after extensive experimentation.
In the standard telling, this is a story of failure; it shows that positive law
providing pre-insolvency creditor protection cannot work. 4 3 The following retelling of the story highlights a different aspect. It connects the
"failure" of legal protection for creditors to the appearance of the management corporation around the turn of this century. Creditor protection declined, at least in part, because management corporations made it
seem less needed. Management corporations offered better creditor protection in practice. Second, norms of creditor protection continue to
hold a place in corporate law, albeit a subsidiary one. Corporate law,
closely inspected, does not sanction unfettered risk taking by managers.
The test for legal intervention in a debtor's affairs, "insolvency or near
insolvency," reflects the law's equivocation. 44 A fairness ethic supports
this hesitant recognition of creditors' interests.
a. The rise andfall of creditorprotection in corporatelaw. Creditor protection came into corporate law in the mid-nineteenth century
with the first general corporation laws. These laws limited stockholders'
liability as a usual consequence of incorporation. 4 5 At the same time,
they imposed the creditor-protective provisions now known as the legal
capital rules. These provided for minimum capital, required that stockholders pay for stock issued, and constrained dividends and other distributions of capital to stockholders. Like limited liability, these rules were
a fundamental part of corporate structure; they made creditor protection
an intrinsic aspect of corporateness.46
Ironically, the legal capital rules allayed individualist suspicions of
corporations. Mid-nineteenth century corporations produced and transacted where only individuals had acted before. This change disturbed
distance from governance-a central incident of the off-the-rack debtor-creditor model-must be

built into any rational corporate structure.
43. See B. MANNING, supra note 38, at 84-90.

44. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
45. During the time of the special charter incorporation, corporate status did not inevitably
imply limited liability, and charters did not contain creditor-protective provisions. See J. HURST,
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

1970, at 51 (1970).
46. See id. at 27-28, 51-52 (legal capital rules offset limited liability).

1780-
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many people, who charged that corporations subverted the market's
check on private economic power;, as separate economic entities, they
dispersed individual moral and legal responsibility among groups of businessmen. 47 The new corporation laws addressed these individualist concerns. These statutes contained numerous restraints against corporate
and managerial power,4 including the legal capital rules.
The judicial doctrine of disregarding the corporate fiction also appeared during this period 49 and stemmed from the same pattern of response. Under the doctrine of limited liability, the law treats borrowing
corporations as separate entities, easily analogized to borrowing individuals.so But the residuum of individualist suspicion against corporations
prompted the courts to make an exception to the rule: limited liability
would apply only so long as a corporation conducted its business according to the requirements of the legal model. Formal integrity had to be
maintained; viewed objectively, the corporation had to act as a separate
person. If the corporation did not do so, the law would revert to the
general rule of individual responsibility and hold the corporation's stockholders responsible for its debts.
Management corporations-large corporations performing multiple
tasks of production and marketing under the control of hierarchies of
managers-appeared around 1890. They rapidly came to dominate the
American economy. Corporate law supported them, and, in so doing,
changed. The "liberal incorporation" statutes of the early twentieth century offered standardized corporate structures without imposing ancillary regulation of business decisions.5 1 This support for management
came at the expense of outside investors--both stockholders and creditors. The legal capital rules, not notably effective in the first place, were
52

diluted.

The dilution of the legal capital rules brought the corporate debtorcreditor model into conformity with the model from noncorporate
47. See Bratton, Historical Perspective supra note 29.

48. IL
49. See Central Trust Co. v. Bridges, 57 F. 753, 766 (6th Cir. 1893), modified sub. nom. Central
Trust Co. v. Condon, 67 F. 84 (6th Cir. 1895); Atchison, T. & S.F.R1R. v. Davis, 34 Kan. 209, 210, 8
P. 530,531 (1885); Blumberg, Limited Liability and CorporateGroups, 11 i. CORP. L. 573, 594, 60911 (1986); Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. R Ev. 496, 498-506 (1912)
(discussing late 18th- and early 19th-century cases that looked beyond corporate fiction).
50. For this reason, corporate law's adoption of debtor-creditor doctrine designed for individual borrowers has never presented great conceptual problems. See also supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing debtor-creditor law in corporate context).
51. See Bratton, HistoricalPerspecives supra note 29.
52. The incorporation statutes authorized low-par and no-par common stock, permitted minimal paid-in capital and later reductions of capital, and dropped requirements for minimum debtequity ratios. See J. HuRsT, supra note 45, at 53.
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debtor-creditor law for the first time. Corporate law continued to offer a
series of creditor-protective provisions. In practice, however, these protections applied only to gross abuse-debtor actions at or near
53
insolvency.
Those with the most to lose, long-term creditors of management
corporations, took the changes in stride. Creditors' relations with the
new management corporations took on a new dynamic. The new managers were less likely to act in derogation of creditors' interests than were
the entrepreneurial owner-managers of the smaller corporations of the
preceding period. To creditors' comfort, the new managers took a longterm, institutional view; they eschewed short-term gambles for investment with an eye to continuity.5 4 At the same time, creditors developed
new modes of contractual self-protection. The debenture indenture, the
contract vehicle that facilitated public sales of the new corporations' unsecured debt, appeared around 1900, just as states began diluting the
legal capital rules. This device solved problems of enforcement and monitoring by widely dispersed debtholders. It also introduced the business
covenant as a more flexible security device than the real property
55
mortgage.
Thus, corporate law dispensed with most creditor protections only
after the turn of the century. Corporate doctrine thereafter gradually
evolved toward the traditional debtor-creditor standard of nonintervention. But the change did not follow from some sudden theoretical recognition of a strict analogy between corporate and individual debtorcreditor relationships. Nor did it follow from some surge of theoretical
contractualism.5 6 Rather, nonintervention followed from relational practices that evolved with the new management corporations. Large, permanent-looking producing institutions emerged as borrowers. Their
creditors had well-founded expectations of the borrowers' institutional
53. Id.
54. Id. at 54-55.
55. Garrett, A Borrower's View ofthe Model CorporateDebentureIndenture Provisions, 21 Bus.

LAW. 675, 678-80 (1966). The amount of money outstanding in corporate debentures grew enormously during the decades after 1900. Before the indenture appeared, a debenture stated holders'
rights directly on the note; this practice led to problems of enforcement and monitoring. The inden-

ture solved the problem by channeling performance rights through a trustee for the benefit of the
holders of a debenture. Id. at 678.
Mortgage indentures, in contrast, first appeared during early American corporate history. They
were invented in the 1830s to facilitate the debt financing of the great capital projects of the daycanals, railroads, and turnpikes. See Banks, Indenture Securitiesand the Barkley Bil 48 YALE L.J.
533, 534 (1939).
56. On the contrary, of all decades in the history of corporate doctrine, the first decades of the
twentieth century showed the least focus on contract ideas. See Bratton, HistoricalPerspectives,
supra note 29.
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stability. Moreover, those who controlled these borrowing institutions
had common interests with their long-term creditors. As a result, longterm unsecured lending made sense for the first time. As creditors abandoned the ancient requirement of a tangible security, contract became
feasible as the sole basis for long-term corporate debt. Debt became
"contractual" in legal theory in the wake of these practical developments. This recognition conveniently served management's interests.
Creditors, meanwhile, evolved into passive investors holding strictly de57
limited rights and presenting no threat to management control.
Although corporate debt became contractual, it was not always exclusively so. And it need not always remain so. If the institutional situation that gave rise to this theoretical approach should change
substantially, the theory can be reconsidered. Arguably, such changes
have occurred in recent years. The corporate restructuring movement
has destabilized management's institutional position, to the detriment of
unsecured creditors. At the same time, it has lessened corporate law's
58
managerialist bias.
b. Norms of creditorprotection in corporatedoctine-equivocation
in the traditionalconception. Policy debates on the appropriateness of
legal intervention in corporate debtor-creditor relationships continue today, despite the apparently settled state of the doctrine. Different views
on the desirability of management risk taking animate these discussions.
Under one line of thinking, risk can be a bad thing, and managers
should be discouraged from taking on too much of it. Obviously, in an
uncertain world, investing entails risk. Undertaking this risk is generally
desirable, as long as an investing manager brings care and deliberation to
the task. Speculation is a different, less prudent and more questionable
endeavor.5 9 It lacks a legitimating tie to the work ethic. The speculator
seeks to get something for nothing, like a gambler.
This antispeculative thinking bears on corporate debtor-creditor
policy; given limited liability, the owner of a heavily indebted corporation is particularly likely to make speculative investments. Such investments have substantial upside potential, and creditors bear the risk of
57. Fitting stockholders into the practical mold of the passive investor has proved a tougher
proposition. Characterized as the problem of the "separation of ownership and control," it has
created all sorts of conceptual problems for corporate law in this century, given the persistence of the
old property model of stock ownership. See ad

58. The changes implications are discussed infra notes 186-345 and accompanying text.
59. See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQuES 47-58 (1962) ("prudent conduct require[s] that purchases of common stocks at prices that
rely heavily on future developments to justify the commitment be recognized as at least partially
speculative in their nature").
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failure. An antispeculative observer would argue that the lack of creditor
protection in law encourages such inefficient, excessively risky investments. This observer would also argue that debtor protection in the form
of corporate limited liability invites the commission of business torts.
This possibility forces creditors to allocate resources to research and
monitoring-expenditures ultimately passed on in the form of higher

prices.

60

An opposing line of thinking defends risk, even in large doses, drawing on the assumptions of neoclassical microeconomics. 61 Risk is a good
thing-production, after all, is intrinsically risky. Furthermore, given
rational parties and competition, prices in contracts, including debt contracts, reflect the risks assumed. 62 We can justify legal intervention only

if it reduces costs, that is, only if most parties would contract for the
provision in question anyway. 63 Accordingly, legal intervention to protect a contract creditor is rarely justified. A creditor's consent to a transaction vitiates the business tort described in the antispeculative

argument.64 In addition, creditor protection in law would chill manage65

ment risk taking.
Both lines of thinking influence contemporary corporate debtorcreditor doctrine. This doctrine includes the remains of the nineteenthcentury legal capital rules, fraudulent conveyance law, the judicial doctrine of disregarding the corporate fiction, and the equitable subordination provisions of bankruptcy law. 6 This bundle of provisions
instantiates the conflict over management risk taking. The doctrine accords recognition to antispeculative values and makes a number of ges60. See Conard, Theses for a Corporate Reformation, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 259, 269-71
(1986). For a thought-provoking variation on this argument, see Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull,
An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in CorporationLaw. 30 U. TORoNTo LJ. 117 (1980).
Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull take the position that limited liability permits stockholders to
make uncompensated transfers of business risks to creditors, and thus creates incentives for firms to
allocate excessive resources to risky investments. They find that limited liability is efficient only in
the case of management corporations. Limited liability facilitates the trading of management corporations' equity securities by preventing costly uncertainties in valuation. In close corporations, however, it creates a moral hazard and leads to costly attempts to avert risk. Id at 126, 147-48.
61. For a discussion of these assumptions, see infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
62. Eg., Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,52 U. CH. L REv. 89,
94 (1985) (limited liability reduces cost of separating management and capital).
63. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 28, at 834-36 (discussing fraudulent conveyance law).
64. See Carlson, Is FraudulentConveyance Law Efficient? 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 643, 648-49,
675-76 (1987).
65. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 28, at 839 (arguing against expansive application of fraudulent conveyance laws).
66. For a comparative study of these legal regimes, see Clark, The Duties of the Corporate
Debtor to its Creditors; 90 HARv. L. REv. 505 (1977).

VoL 1989.92]

CORPORATE DEBT RELATIONSHIPS

tures in the direction of creditor protection. But, recognizing the
opposing point of view as well, it keeps these gestures ineffective.
The doctrine's creditor-protective gestures tend to concern the conduct of inadequately capitalized debtors. Section 5 of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act contains the principal constraint. 67 This
fraudulent conveyance rule not only prohibits transactions of an insolvent debtor and transactions that cause insolvency, 6 but also transactions that leave an operating debtor with unreasonably small capital.
Restated, section 5 conditions the validity of transfers for inadequate
consideration on adequate capitalization. It has been applied only rarely,
however, and commentators attach little importance to it.69 Inadequate
capitalization also justifies piercing the corporate veil in favor of involuntary creditors in some cases.70 In addition, concern over inadequate capitalization informs equitable subordination rules in bankruptcy that
7
prevent recognition of controlling stockholders' debt claims.

A body of caselaw gives these provisions rhetorical support. The
cases use fiduciary language to condemn fraudulent conveyances by corporate owners. The usage can be traced back to 1824, when, in Wood v.
Dummer, Justice Story described the corporate capital protected against
fraudulent conveyances as a "trust fund." 72 This language was often
cited thereafter, despite the fact that Wood involved neither a "trust" nor
a "fund"; 73 it survived as a creditor-protective metaphor. Justice Douglas reinforced this rhetorical tradition in the 1939 case Pepper v. Litton,
explaining the Court's avoidance of another garden-variety fraudulent
conveyance in terms of a fiduciary duty to creditors. 74
67. UNI. FAUDuLENT CONVEYANCE Acr § 5, 7A U.L.A. 504 (1985); see also UNu.
FRAuDULENr TRANSFER AcT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 652-53 (1985).
68. UNIP. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AcT § 4, 7A U.L.A- at 474; see also id § 7, 7A U.L.A.
at 509 (prohibiting conveyances made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors).

69. See, e-.Note,Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REv.
1491, 1508 (1987). Clark explains section 5 as an assurance that technical insolvency provisions do
not vitiate the purpose of the broader prohibition on fraudulent conveyances. Clark, supra note 66,
at 545.
70. See Clark, supra note 66, at 547. The leading case is Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576,
579, 364 P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1961) (en banc).
71. See e.g. Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497, 501-02 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 313 U.S. 583
(1941) level
of capitalization of firm showed that advances received by controlling creditor constituted loans, not new creditor capital); see also Clark, supra note 66, at 534-35 (thin capitalization,
while not necessarily a sole and sufficient basis for subordination of stockholders' claims, often accompanies such subordination).
72. 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944) (involving transfer of assets to stock-

holders, made at point of insolvency).
73. B. MANNiNG, supra note 38, at 46.
74. 308 U.S. 295, 310-12 (1939). Among the subsequent cases applying these fiduciary principles are Brown v. Presbyterian Ministers Fund, 484 F.2d 998, 1005 (3d Cir. 1973); Bayliss v. Rood,
424 F.2d 142, 146 (4th Cir. 1970).
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Outside of this fragmentary group of cases and statutes, the law mediates corporate debtors' and creditors' interests by hewing to the insolvency line. The provisions just described support the integrity of
promises to repay against debtors' abusive conduct, but stop short of supporting creditors' interests with affirmative duties of management cooperation. 75 Yet no intrinsic, technical barriers make the imposition of
such duties impracticable. Corporate law could protect creditors by regulating management risk taking. Presumably, such regulation would impose minimum capital requirements that would ensure a substantial asset
cushion above a corporation's total liabilities.76 For the regulation to
have teeth, it would have to constrain management's discretion to finance, invest, and distribute assets once the danger line was reached. 77
The absence of such a regime affirms the risk-favorable line of thinking.
But we should not dismiss this persistent, hesitant, and ineffective
pattern of legal creditor protection as historical detritus. 78 As long as we
avoid a narrow instrumentalist perspective, the pattern can be explained
and justified: it persists in order to withhold full legitimation of risk taking. Section 5 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the legal capital rules, and the rhetoric of the cases together establish that the law
may censure debtor conduct that occurs before insolvency. The underlying norm asserts that when insolvency is a real possibility, debtor con75. See Clark, supra note 66, at 547. Clark, reviewing the veil-piercing and equitable subordination cases, suggests that they reflect judicial experimentation with a new duty of cooperation.
Events since the publication of Clark's article suggest that we can expect little further experimentation of this sort. See infra notes 269-88 and accompanying text.
Corporate debtor-creditor law continues to uphold the moral ideals Clark identified-truthfulness, respect (a moral duty to give.legal obligations primacy over one's self.interest), evenhandedness
among creditors, and nonhindrance of satisfaction of creditors' claims. ML at 509-13. Carlson's
exposition of the values underlying fraudulent conveyance law resembles Clark's. Carlson emphasizes the norm of keeping promises, the work ethic, and the norm against intentionally inflicting
harm. Carlson, supra note 64, at 672-74.
76. California, for example, requires an assets-to-liabilities ratio of 1.25 to 1. CAL CORP. CODE
§ 500(b) (West Supp. 1989). A state might also require interest coverage providing a cushion above
equity insolvency.
77. Clark suggests that, at a minimum, the law should forbid dividends at this point, and that it
should forbid new indebtedness absent an affirmative showing that such indebtedness would improve
the situation of the company at issue. For still more effective protection, he suggests a requirement
that a company in danger of insolvency, raise new equity capital. This suggestion, however, would
conflict with the policy favoring limited liabilty. Clark, supra note 66, at 559-60. Clark suggests
using a concrete ratio test to set the "danger line." Id; see also Keustermans, Countertrends in
FinancialProvisionsfor the Protection of Corporate Creditors: The Model Business CorporationAct
and the E-EC Corporate Directives, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 275, 298 (1986) (both U.S. and
E.E.C. corporate law would benefit from a meaningful financial ratio test). For the alternate view,
see Conard, supra note 60, at 288-89 (advocating a reasonableness standard set with reference to
capitalization patterns in each industrial group).
78. The provisions have been fairly attacked for "analytic naivete and want of policy content."
B. MANNING, supra note 38, at x.
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duct that injures creditors has no legal sanction. The provisions still lack
"teeth"-effective enforcement provisions benefiting creditors. They do
not provide an effective means to a concretely conceived end. But they at
least take some conduct out of the zone of free contract, where the law
implicitly sanctions self-interested conduct. At certain legal margins,
this refusal can determine an outcome. And the survival of these rules7 9
confirms the general acceptance of the underlying norm. 80
C.

CorporateDebt as Investment The Realist Revision

1. Economics and History. According to an old financial maxim,
borrow $1000 and you have a banker; borrow $1,000,000 and you have a
partner.8 1 The maxim challenges the traditional conception's fundamental economic assumption, a clear distinction between debt and equity.
Under that assumption, debt's basis in a promise to pay makes it materially different from equity, with its exposure to the highest risk of loss.
The maxim, in contrast, asserts that debt and equity are not so easily
distinguished, at least with a large, long-term loan. This assertion underlies the "investment" conception.
The investment conception emphasizes the shared characteristics of
debt and equity-debt and equity investments differ only in degree; they
are not fundamentally different forms of participation. 82 Like equity investors, debt investors have their funds tied up in the fortunes of the
79. The legal capital rules, with their analytically naive formalities, symbolically impress the
norm on persons doing business in the coprorate form. I. at 88-89. They thus can be justified in
the categories that Fuller and von Mehren described for legal formalities. A formality "channels"

behavior by signaling an actor's awareness that certain conduct may have legal significance, and it
deters by making suspect transactions harder to complete. See Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41
COLUM. L REV.799, 801-03 (1941); von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration:An Exercise in ComparativeAnalysi. 72 HARv. L.REV. 1009, 1016-17 (1959). More broadly, the provisions
withhold legal sanction from loosely defined patterns of behavior.
Their failure to satisfy instrumentalist policy scrutiny does not justify their removal. Interest"ingly, just such arguments underlie a recent reform of the Model Business Corporation Act's legal
capital provisions. The new provisions in effect make the insolvency line the sole corporate debtorcreditor provision, yet the drafters justify the new provisions in terms of creditor protection. They
argue that the current legal capital rules provide no concrete protection and may mislead securityholders who rely on thepn. ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes inthe Model Business
CorporationAct-Amendments to FnancialPovision= 34 Bus. LAW. 1867, 1867-69 (1979). The
problem is that, by retreating to the insolvency line, the reformed provisions make the pre-insolvency
gray area part of the zone of free contracting. This change poses significant harm to creditors. For
an instrumentalist attack on the reform suggestions, see Keustermans, supra note 77, at 292-93.
80. B. MANNING, supra note 38, at 89 (provisions may psychologically inhibit corporate management from distributing assets indiscriminately). Manning recognizes the historical, cultural, and
psychological powers of the legal capital provisions even as he joins in the movement for their abolition. leL at 164-67.
81. R. BREALEY & S.MYERS PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 395 (2d ed. 1984).
82. Frank, Book Review, 42 YALE LJ.989, 992-93 (1933) (reviewing A. BERLE & G. MEANs
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)); see also Llewellyn, What Price

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1989:92

enterprise.8 3 Like equity, debt can be dispersed among widespread small
holders. Debtholders thus join equityholders as outsiders dependent on

effective performance by corporate managers, a separate interest group
without substantial security holdings. Given these characteristics, even
notions of common enterprise and norms of cooperation may appropriately describe debt-equity relationships.
The investment conception sprang from historical experience. Beginning with mid-nineteenth-century railroad bonds, and extending to all
debt of management corporations after the turn of the century, payment
defaults no longer resulted in direct enforcement of promises to repay.
Tearing up a railroad and selling it made no economic sense.84 To preserve going concerns, payment difficulties had to be "worked out." A
reinterpretation of the debt exchange resulted. A promise to repay could
no longer be taken literally. A creditor looked for repayment less to the
promise than to the continuing vitality of the promisor's enterprise.8 5 A
promise to pay, in reality, amounted to a promise to "refund" if the enterprise succeeded, and a basis for priority over equityholders if the enterprise failed.86 The promise did operate literally upon liquidation-but
large modern corporations are rarely liquidated, even in bankruptcy.
Thus linked to the business's fortunes, creditors become investors.
Academic writing on the investment conception first appeared in the
early part of this century. Alfred Dewing, who wrote the period's lead88
ing business treatise, advocated it.87 Legal realists, including Berle,
Frank,89 Llewellyn, 90 and Douglas, 91 introduced it to corporate law.
These writers predicted that the new concept would come to dominate
the law.
Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 724 (1931) (debt contract ensures either
performance or ratable share in bankruptcy).
83. 1 A. DEWING, supra note 25, at 166-67.
84. Id at 236-37.

85. See, e-g., J. HuRST, supra note 45, at 54; B. MANNING, supra note 38, at 14.
86. 1 A. DEWING, supra note 25, at 236-37. As Jerome Frank cynically put it, this "priority"

translates to an undertaking by creditors to accept new securities at the option of those in control in
the event of financial embarrassment and a corporate reorganization. Frank, supra note 82, at 992.
87. See 1 A. DEwING, supra note 25, at 166-67, 236-37. Citing an omnipresent "more realistic
attitude," Dewing predicted that bondholders would receive certain management rights. Id. at 16667. The basic economic point that stockholders, bearing the residual risk, have the incentive to raise
profits and therefore should control, rebuts Dewing's argument. See McDaniel, Bondholders 1,
supra note 10, at 440-41.

88. See A. BERLE, supra note 28, at 156. Berle predicted that pursuit of a rule of management
duty to the "general" interest of "investors" would result in corporate creditors receiving judicial
protection beyond the strict letter of their contracts. Id.
89. See Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of CorporateReorganization, 19 VA.
L. REv. 541, 566-67 (1933); Frank, supra note 82, at 992-93.

90. See Llewellyn, supra note 82, at 724.
91. See W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 177-78 (1940).
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2. The Investment Conception and CorporateLegal Theory. Advocates of the investment conception look past traditional corporate doctrine to business practice. They describe a variable, tripartite
relationship among debtholders, equityholders, and management. 92
They focus on management power and work to control it in law, considering the constituent relationships in the corporation's financial structure
against the background of management power, one by one. 93 The
classical stockholder-entrepreneur has disappeared, and the creditor no longer
appears as a refined and hostile opponent. More likely than not, the
creditor is a bondholder-a single investor holding a piece of paper that
gives no practical means of achieving corporate power.

In this conception, creditors are aligned with stockholders in the
antimanagerialist vision of corporate power relationships. Both occupy a
position resembling that of the weak party in a trust relationship; the
managers possess the power.94 Carried to its logical conclusion, the conception questions why corporate law directs management fiduciary duties
to equity interests only. 95 Creditor protection in law follows as a practical possibility and a policy priority.
D.

The Traditionaland Investment Conceptions as Competing
Influences on the Development of CorporateLaw

The investment conception has influenced the development of corporate law, but it has never achieved the permanent ascendancy predicted by its realist advocates. Instead, corporate law has held to its basis
in the traditional conception, relegating the investment conception and
its creditor-protective norm to a supplemental position.
1. Depression-Era Reforms The investment conception heavily
influenced the statutory reforms of the Depression era-the bankruptcy
acts of 193396 and 193897 and the federal securities laws. 98 The bankruptcy reforms admitted bondholders to corporate ownership, treating
92. Berle introduced this concept in 1928. See A. BERLE, supra note 28, at 181-94.
93. See, eg, i&
94. In Berle's words, both creditors and stockholders depend on management's "fidelity and

business integrity." Id at 156.
95. See eg., Conard, supra note 60, at 276-78.
96. Bankruptcy Act of 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467 (revised 1938).
97. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
98. Eg. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa).
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them as joint owners with a prior claim against corporate assets.9 9 To

limit management power for the benefit of all interested parties, creditors
and workers as well as stockholders, these laws provided for administrative evaluation and judicial approval of reorganization plans. The federal
securities laws, in turn, protected all securityholders, whether of debt or
equity.100 With the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,101 even the standard
debt contract underwent reform. Antimanagerialists charged that managers and investment bankers dominated workouts and reorganizations,
recapitalizing companies at the expense of small bondholders. 1°2 The
Trust Indenture Act responded by mandating that debt contracts governing publicly issued bonds include certain procedural protections, most
notably a prohibition against less-than-unanimous waivers of important
10 3

contract rights.
These federal reforms, while substantial, did not dislodge the traditional conception from its central position in corporate law. t0 4 Although
the federal securities laws protected small investors by imposing new
rules to govern investment processes, 10 5 they otherwise accepted the received doctrinal model of corporate organization. Although the bankruptcy acts moved creditor protection to the forefront of the law, they
followed and complemented the traditional debtor-creditor mediation. 106
The Trust Indenture Act, the only reform designed to introduce creditorprotective duties in the pre-insolvency workout stage, did so by employing mandatory contract provisions, a legislative technique designed to
avoid disruption of the underlying contractual regime. Thus, corporate
debt relationships remained contractual even as they became heavily
regulated.
99. 1 A. DEWING, supra note 25, at 237 & n.72. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, ch. 687, secs. 6-7, 49 Stat. 803, 814-17 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79f-79g), under which most of
the country's utilities were recapitalized, also gave creditors a protected position.
100. See, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(I), 78c(aXIO) (defining "security" to include, inter alia, bonds, debentures, and evidence of indebtedness).
101. Ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb).
102. Commentators rebutted this allegation at the time. Defenders of management said that the
instances of abuse were exaggerated and that the corporate trust system was working better than at
any earlier point in its century-long history. See Banks, supra note 55, at 539-43 (corporate trust
indenture does not provide complete escape from responsibility and works with unusual success).
103. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb; see also Roe, The Voting Prohibitionin Bond Workout, 97
YALE L.J. 232,250-69 (1987) (summarizing policy reasons for prohibition against waivers ofimportant contract rights upon less than unanimous bondholder consent and discussing why those policy
reasons are no longer relevant).
104. They have, however, loosened the traditional conception's hold. See Bratton, Convertible
Bond supra note 10, at 734.
105. See J. HuRsr, supra note 45, at 55.
106. That is, they imposed intensive creditor protection only after insolvency and the commencement of receivership.
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2. Paterns from 1945 to 198a
a. Legal practice. Postwar prosperity and stability fostered
peaceful coexistence between the traditional and investment conceptions,
at least in the world of law practice. Practitioners blended the two conceptionsY'07 Debt contracting, while remaining adversarial, no longer
seemed to fit perfectly into the classical framework of hard bargaining
between parties at arm's length. The best practice, taking cognizance of
the nature of the debt relationship, balanced adversity and cooperation.108 Under the influence of the investment conception, practitioners
used the tools of law reform to improve the debt contracting process by
institutionalizing this balanced approach. The organized corporate bar
drafted not one, but two model debenture indentures,10 9 which amounted
to model governance statutes. They echoed the Berlian corporate model,
looking toward consensus provisions that would satisfy the competing
interests of all parties in corporate financings--bondholders, borrowers,
lending institutions, investment bankers, and corporate trustees.""
As adversity waned, bondholders also demanded less security. With
the largest, most stable corporate borrowers, contract protections, even
those following model forms, began to disappear from practice."1 Given
these institutions' strength and their managers' clear interest in continued stability, these protections seemed superfluous.' 12 Thus, bonds, conceived in theory to resemble stock, began to resemble it in practice. A
bond without covenants, like a share of stock, is an investment made
under loose legal guidelines that leave management discretion largely

unimpaired.
b. Caselaw. Whereas postwar practice-sought to synthesize the
traditional and investment conceptions, postwar cases treated the two
conceptions as opposites. Courts deciding stockholder-bondholder disputes invariably privilege one conception, and doctrinal approaches follow from the conception favored.
107. Depression-era memories faded slowly. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 finally removed the more extreme creditor-protective provisions of the 1938 statute. Specifically, it abandoned the absolute priority rule and mandatory SEC inspection of companies' reorganization plans
in favor of a more contractual model. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
108. See Garrett, supra note 55, at 682.
109. See ABF CommEmrAmEs, supra note 33, at 14; ABA Section of Corp., Banking & Business Law, Model SimplifiedIndenture, 38 Bus. LAW. 741 (1983) [hereinafter MSI].
110. See, e-g, MSI, supra note 109, at 742.
ill. Indeed, the second model indenture form omitted business covenants entirely. The form's
drafters stated that business covenants were left to negotiation. See id at 743. In contrast, the
model indenture put together a decade earlier assumed that business covenants would be included in

the ordinary coure.
112. See infra notes 206-19 and accompanying text.

118
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L Fiduciary duties. The traditional conception, with its assertions that debtholders are not a firm's "owners" and that the debtorcreditor relationship is contractual, forecloses imposition of a bondholder-protective fiduciary duty. The investment conception, in contrast,
opens fiduciary possibilities by encouraging a situational approach to corporate duties and stressing the characteristics shared by bondholders and
the traditional beneficiaries of fiduciary duties, stockholders.
The Delaware courts have been the traditional conception's firmest
adherents, becoming quite outspoken in recent years. 11 3 In Delaware,
bondholder rights follow the debtor-creditor model. The bondholder has
contract rights only, except in extreme situations of fraud or insolvency;' 1 4 beyond the promise to repay and the integrity of that promise,
the bondholder has no rights against self-interested issuer conduct.I1 5 If
113. The best-known instance of this outspokenness is Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (DeL 1986), a pivotal takeover case. Revlon, in the course of a defensive exchange offer to its own stockholders, placed debentures containing a restrictive covenant that
was waivable by Revlon's independent directors. During a later phase of the takeover contest, the
board waived the covenant to facilitate a defensive merger. Bondholders protested. The board defended its choice to engage in the defensive transaction partly on the ground that the defensive
offeror offered to support the price of the debentures. I& at 180-81; ef R. CLARx, supra note 40, at
25 (stating business judgment rule).
The court held the board's creditor-protective rationale impermissible. 506 A.2d at 182. Because the board had reached the "auction" stage--it was no longer taking action to preserve Revlon
as an entity-it was not free to take nonstockholder interests into account.
The opinion blends the usual consignment of creditors to contractual protection with a special
"auction" limitation on the business judgment rule. Cf id, at 182-83. The business judgment rule
would ordinarily bar scrutiny of a board's bondholder-protective decision, as long as the board could
show some rational connection to stockholder interests. Presumably, the need to maintain good will
in the credit markets would afford a sufficiently rational connection.
114. The leading case is Harff.v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), re'd, 347 A.2d 133
(Del. 1975). In Harff convertible bondholders challenged a large dividend as a breach of fiduciary
duty. The Chancellor granted a motion to dismiss on the ground that no fiduciary duty existed, and,
in another connection, cited Parkinson v. West End St. Ry., 173 Mass. 446, 53 N.E. 891 (1899)
(Holmes, J.), the classic case characterizing convertible bonds as contracts. The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed, interpreting the complaint to contain an allegation of fraud. 347 A.2d at 134; see
also Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc., 253 A.2d 72, 75 (Del. 1969) (debenture and certificate
holders' rights determined exclusively by contract); Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785 (Del. Ch. 1987)
(reaffirming Harff rule), aff'4 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873 (Del.
Ch. 1986) (same).
The Harffcourt's implicit asssumption that corporate creditors historically have not benefitted
from legal protection is, of course, incorrect. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text; see also
Stetson, Preparationof Corporate Bonds; Mortgages CollateralTrusts and Debenture Indentures, in
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 25-27 (1917) (justifying complexity of trust indentures,

not on ground that no legal protection exists, but on ground that implied-in-law protection is too

uncertain).
115. See Fox v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 137 Cal. App. 3d 524, 528, 187 Cal. Rptr. 141, 143
(1982) (following Delaware approach); see also Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 531.
540, 155 Cal. Rptr. 94, 100 (1979) ('holders of debentures, with an option to convert, remain corporate creditors only, without any special status which affords them the opportunity to litigate in the
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the bondholder suffers an injury, it is a risk that he assumed.' 1 6
The decisions of some federal appellate courts depart from the traditional conception. These courts pick up the invitation extended by Justice Douglass Pepper v. Litton 117 rhetoric, invoking fiduciary principles
and applying fairness scrutiny to corporate action that injures bondholders.1 18 But the decisions set out this fiduciary duty very tentatively. Discussion of the source and nature of the duty tends to be fragmentary, and
the duty's precise relationship to contract terms is unclear. The duty
sometimes overrides contract terms, affording additional protection
based on a bondholder's relationship with a corporation. 119 In most
cases, however the duty remains subject to the contract's terms; it takes a
breach of contract to breach the duty. 120
i& Contractdutie. Stockholder-bondholder disputes also tend to
raise contract-law issues, usually in connection with interpretation of
debt contracts. Contract law offers a surprisingly wide selection of
norms for resolution of these disputes. Here again, a decisionmaker's
underlying conception of the relationship-traditional or investmentinfluences doctrinal choice.
, Decisionmakers following the traditional conception apply classical
contract doctrine-the doctrine recognized by Williston and the first Restatement Classical doctrine presupposes an adverse and arm's-length
relationship: the party asserting a right bears the burden of drafting it
into the coitract. It also assumes that contract language has an immutable meaning: applying the correct interpretive calculus leads to the ob12 1
jectively correct meaning.
Decisionmakers who follow the investment conception apply neoclassical contract doctrine-the contract law of Corbin and the Restatearea of potential damage to their economic interests"); ABF COMMENTAmiES, supra note 33, at 1-2
(debtholders' rights largely a matter of contract).
116. See ,g., Harff,324 A.2d at 219, 222 (debenture holders' rights determined by their con-

tract alone).
117. 308 U.S. 295 (1939); see supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
118. See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.LR., 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J.,
announcing panel judgment) (implying fiduciary duty to convertible debenture holders), cert denied,
459 U.S. 1056 (1982); Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723, 726-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(convertible debenture holders entitled to Rule lOb-5 protection).
119. Se4 eg., Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1383-84 (2d Cir.) (issuer has duty to
give notice of redemption call), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975). A later panel of the same court,
however, characterized the opinion as based on the contract-law duty of good faith. Van Gemert v.
Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1977).
120. See ag., Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (no breach of fiduciary duty unless derived from terms of trust indenture), vacated
on other grounds, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1985).
121. Bratton, Convertible Bonds supra note 10, at 692.
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ment (Second). No preconceived drafting burden confines the inquiry to
explicit language. Nor does the investment conception include an assumption that language has an immutable meaning, which would limit
interpretive inquiries to standard English usage. Instead, the decisionmaker goes beyond linguistic and structural analysis of a document
to consider the parties' entire relationship, seeking the meaning most
consonant with the parties' expectations. Under the rubric of contractual "good faith," decisionmakers bring ethical constraints to bear
1 22
against self-interested conduct that injures other contract parties.
Not suprisingly,. the same courts that refuse to extend a fiduciary
duty to bondholders decline to pursue the more open-ended neoclassical
inquiry into a contract's meaning. The traditional conception underlies
both results. 123 Under classical interpretive constraints, bondholder
claims that would be entirely plausible under a broader interpretive perspective invariably fail. 124 A smaller group of cases, following the investment conception, abandons classical interpretive restraints and reverses
122. Id at 684, 692.
123. The leading case, Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 959 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cerL denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981), invokes the history and function of trust indentures to justify the
application of classical principles: clarity and consistency must prevail over complex relational analyses. See also Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R, 680 F.2d 933, 942 (3d Cir.) (Rule
lOb-5 violation renders reference to other sources of duty to bondholders unnecessary), cert. denied
459 U.S. 1056 (1982), Gardner& Florenc 589 F. Supp. at 673 ("Fiduciary duties ... do not exist in
the abstract, but are derived from the Indenture itself."); Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal.
App. 3d 531, 539-40, 155 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99-100 (1979) (delisting of stock and debentures because of
issuing corporation's acquisition not breach of duty to convertible debenture holders); Levine v.
Chesapeake & O.R.R., 60 A.D.2d 246, 249, 400 N.Y.S.2d 76, 78 (1977) (elimination of public market for shares was attributable to national economic factors and not actionably unfair to
bondholders).
Broad and opinions following it tend to restrict analysis to the four corners of a debt instrument. Even good faith becomes a limited notion, a product of the "parties' intent" rather than a
fairness norm imposed from outside. See, eg., Gardner& Florence, 589 F. Supp. at 673 (implied
covenant of good faith derives substance directly from Indenture's language and cannot give debenture holders any rights inconsistent with those set out in the Indentures); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508
A.2d 873, 897 n.7 (Del. Ch. 1986) (corporation's duty of good faith to bondholders differs from its
duty to stockholders).
124. See Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 10, at 695-96 (neoclassical interpretive mode
could lead to bondholder protection); Bratton, Interpretation. supra note 10, at 389-92, 396-97
(same). The courts do not hew to the classical approach so closely that they deny themselves a look
at the broader context of transactions and the relative values exchanged and risks assumed. Commonly, they turn to classical principles even as their scrutiny of interactions leads them to conclude
that no cognizably unfair action has occurred. The choice of operative conception appears to determine the doctrinal treatment. The Broad opinion, in which the court followed its interpretive ruling
with a defense of the fairness of the issuer's action, provides a good example of this approach. See
642 F.2d at 956-57 ("Insofar as the debt feature of the Debentures is concerned, [the holders]
benefitted by the merger in that the Debentures are now backed by a financially more secure corporation."); see also Levine, 60 A.D.2d at 248, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 78-79 (affirming dismissal of complaint
because "there was no actionable unfairness to the plaintiffs in these transactions").
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the drafting burden.12 To meet the burden, issuers must show contract
language that clearly permits the result they seek. In addition, issuers'
1 26
duties of good faith prevent actions harmful to bondholders.
The caselaw's normative duality reflects the coexistence of the traditional and investment conceptions. Neither conception holds a monopoly, and the caselaw reflects this fact. Yet, the traditional conception
dominates. Intervention to restrain debtors' opportunistic behavior remains occasional and tentative-a supplemental strain. 1 27 Moreover,
even courts influenced by the investment conception continue to respect

traditional structures; they tend to intervene under contract rubrics and
avoid the fiduciary alternative. Contract seems more traditional and thus
lends legitimacy to creditor-protective intervention. Contract lets the
court intervene and at the same time uphold the traditional assumption
that contract parties are the primary lawgivers. Fiduciary law, in contrast, holds out the possibility that judicially articulated norms of conduct may inhere in a relationship, whether or not the actors would

themselves apply them.1 28 Despite the lessons of the investment conception, courts hesitate to make this normative assertion.129
125. The investment conception provides necessary support for this approach. It rebuts the
claim that open-ended contract interpretation creates costly uncertainty. See Bratton, Interpretatiom, supra note 10, at 402-03; see a/so Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039,
1053 (2d Cir. 1982) ("We believe it undermines the plain purpose of the redemption provisions to
allow a liquidating debtor to avoid their terms simply by failing to take the steps necessary to redeem
the debentures, thereby creating a default. We hold, therefore, that the redemption premium must
be paid."), cerm denied, 490 US. 1012 (1983).
126. See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1383-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947
(1975) (duty of reasonable notice to protect small investors); Sharon SteeL 691 F.2d at 1053 (bondholders granted redemption premium since debtor liquidated voluntarily, and therefore could have

avoided default).
The good faith norm can apply against creditors as well as debtors. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving
Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 761-63 (6th Cir. 1985) (lender liable for refusing to disburse funds from
discretionary line of credit); Sahadi v. Continental l. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193, 198-99
(7th Cir. 1983) (lender who called loan after minor default could be liable for borrower's losses);
State Natl Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 681-82 (Tex.Civ. App. 1984) (lender liable for
isrepresenting intention to call loan); see also Rosenberg, An Overview of Workouts from the Perspective of the InstitutionalLender, 16 Loy. U. CHL.LJ.1, 13 (1984) (borrower can sometimes
assert lender's lack of "good faith" as defense to lender's actions upon borrower's default); Note, The
Growth of LenderLiability: An Economic Perspective 21 GA. L REv. 723 (1987) (examining Irving

Trust Sahad4 and Farah).
127. See Bratton, Interpretaton supra note 10, at 372, 407 (advocating movement away from
traditional norms of interpretation when oportunistic debtor behavior goes unsanctioned).
128. See DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of FiduciaryObligaion, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879,
887.
129. The inability of the investment conception to break this pattern of response can be analogized, albeit roughly, to the antimanagerialist model's contemporaneous failure to dominate over the
business judgment tradition. See Bratton, HitoricalPerspectives, supra note 29. In both cases, older
managerialist notions and apparent market acquiescence in them dominate the ethic of investor
protection.
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The Agency Conception: CorporateDebt as a Traded Security

Financial economics is a relatively new, but influential, field. 130 Its
assumptions and findings have become ubiquitous in academic writing on
corporate law, though its influence on caselaw has been limited.1 3 1 Writers in the field have articulated a third, "agency," conception of corporate debt-equity relationships.
The financial economists who articulate the agency conception draw
on the method and techniques of neoclassical microeconomics to model
how various financial instruments and policies affect firm value. 32 Their
models depict rational, wealth-maximizing economic actors operating in
a simple, equilibrated world. Corporate investors become atomized price
takers competing in perfect capital markets. 33 Corporate investment becomes corporate securityholding.
Transposed to legal theory and applied to debt-equity relationships,
financial economics counters both the traditional and investment conceptions. Although many norms common to the traditional conception inform financial economic models, the models have a radically different
foundation. The transactions of rational economic actors bear no resemblance to the emotionally charged engagements of traditional holistically
modeled borrowers and lenders. Financial economics instead builds on
the idea of debt as investmeit in management corporations. In so doing,
however, it discards the dependent, long-term investors who populate the
130. Financial economics emerged between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s. Its proponents claim
to be providing a "scientific" basis for the study of financial behavior. M. JENSEN & C. SMiTH, THE

MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 2-3 (1984). The field has a cohesive analytical core;
basic criticism of its operative paradigm is not entertained. And, despite the abstract and esoteric
nature of much work in financial economics, the financial markets have shown a strong demand for
those trained in the field. Whitley, The Transformadonof Business Financeinto FinancialEconomic The Roles of Academic Expansion and Changes in U.S Capital MarkeM 11 Accr. OROS. &
Soc. 171, 174, 172 (1986).
131. In the courts, financial economics has served as a back-up source of authority. In a number
of recent cases involving conflicts of interest between stockholders and bondholders, courts have
found themselves in need of outside norms. Microeconomics can have influence at this margin. The
courts, accordingly, invoked the "needs" of the market in addition to the expectations of the parties.
For example, the court in Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981), bolstered its narrow reading of a trust indenture with the assertion that
"[a] large degree of uniformity in the language of debenture indentures is essential to the effective

functioning of the financial markets." A Second Circuit panel in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983), also took this
approach. The court worried that "enduring uncertainties as to the meaning of boilerplate provisions would decrease the value of all debenture issues and greatly impair the efficient working of
capital markets."
132. M. JENSEN & C. SMrrH, supra note 130, at 2-3.
133. Whitley, supra note 130, at 175.
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investment conception, replacing them with investors who protect themselves by holding and trading debt securities in a marketplace.
The agency conception appeared in the 1970s, prompted by postwar
economic changes. The capital markets, aided by Depression-era legal

reforms, had reached maturity. By offering a reliable place for trading,13 4 the markets gave practical encouragement to the "securitization"
that lies at the center of the agency concept. The inflation and interestrate volatility of the 1970s accelerated the securitization of debt. Rate
volatility undercut the institutional practice of holding debt to maturity
and caused stepped-up trading. 135 The rise of vigorously competitive financial intermediaries also encouraged securitization. 136 These institutions, with their well-diversified portfolios, practiced the economists' selfprotective theories 37 and made this practice available to small
investors. 13
1. The Tenets of FinancialEconomics. Five theories underlie financial economics. Three of these, the irrelevance hypothesis, the efficient-market hypothesis, and the capital asset pricing model, have
tremendous import for finance practice but bear only incidentally on the
structure of corporate law. The other two theories, the option pricing
model and agency theory, define a model of corporate financial relationships that bears immediately and fundamentally on corporate legal
theory.
134. SWeA. Kaufian & L Zacharias, The Problem of the Corporation and the Problem of
Social Values 1 (1987) (unpublished manuscript; copy on file in offices of the Duke Law Journal)
(The market is "premised on the individual's equal treatment, broad participation, and reasonable

expectation of "just,'or even air,' rewards.").
135. For example, secondary trading in treasury bonds increased tenfold between 1978 and
1985. During the 1980s, the junk bond market arose, responding to the demand for tradable debt
securities. This market joined institutional investors and smaller issuers who were formerly tied to
the old-form private placement; it made high-coupon corporate debt immediately available. See
McDaniel,BondholdersI, supra note 10, at 414-16; Taggart, The Growth ofthe "Junk" Bond Market
and its Role in FinancingTakeoverz in MERGERs AND AcQuismoNs 5, 6-11 (A. Auerbach 4th ed.

1988).
136. See Taggart,supra note 135, at 7. Bank trust departments, insurance companies, investment companies, pension funds, and large corporate treasurers' offices all compete. See Whitley,
supra note 130, at 181.
137. Today, the pension funds alone hold one-third of the equity securities of publicly traded
companies, and half of the equity securities of the largest public companies. See Lipton, Corporate
Governance in the Age ofFinance Corporatism 136 U. PA. L REV. 1, 7 (1987).
138. In contrast, during the first decades of this century, when commentators first focused on the
unprotected small investor, a handful of investment bankers dominated the capital markets and
individuals did not tend to hold investments through intermediaries. Whitley, supra note 130, at
181.
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a. The irrelevance hypothesi, the efficient-market hypothesis, and
the capital asset pricing modeL According to the irrelevance hypothesis, if a firm's investment policy is a given (ignoring tax and transaction

costs), the firm's financing decisions have no effect on its current value.
This "irrelevance" obtains because investors can compete with the firm
in the financial markets. Investors can borrow and lend among them-

selves, adjusting their financial strategies to offset any disequilibria
caused by firms' financing activity. 139 The theory implies that financing

devices, including debt instruments, do not increase firm value.
Although a revolutionary financial proposition, the irrelevance hy-

pothesis has little bearing on corporate law, because it involves heroic
assumptions and lacks institutional context. 140 Irrelevance obtains only
in perfect markets in which all securityholders share the same information and make the same value-maximizing decisions. Under these condi-

tions, investors will be immune to injury from opportunistic behavior by
management or other securityholders-they will have completely hedged
their portfolios against this risk at zero marginal cost. 14 ' Irrelevance,
then, operates in a world of markets so perfect that firms play no role.

Conflicts of interest, the bread and butter of corporate law, do not exist.
The efficient-market hypothesis and the capital asset pricing model,

in contrast, have well-known substantive implications for corporate law.
In efficient markets, securities' prices always reflect all publicly available
139. This is the famous Modigliani-Miller theorem. See Modigliani & Miller, The Cost ofCapltal CorporationFinanceand the Theory of Investmen, AM. ECON. REv., June 1958, at 261; Horri.
gan, The Ethics of the New Finadc 6 J. Bus. ETmics 97, 97-98 (1987); see also A. BRNrA, I.
HAUGEN & L. SENBET, AGENCY PROBLEMS AND FINANCiAL CONTRACTING 7-12 (1985) (summarizing the Modigliani-Miller arbitrage theorem).
140. See Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs ControlPremiums and
CapitalStructure, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 11 (1987) (even assuming that irrelevance hypothesis is substantially correct, contractual solutions to co-investor conflict still lead to elaborate capital structures). Oddly, the irrelevance hypothesis has had a stranglehold on commercial-law theory. See,
eg., Buckley, The Bankruptcy PriorityPuzzle 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1469 (1986); Schwartz, The
ContinuingPuzzle ofSecured Debt 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1068 (1984); Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities A Review of Current Theories 10 . LEGAL STUD. 1, 7-9 (1981);
White, Efficiency Justificationsfor PersonalPropertySecurity, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473, 508 (1984).
The hold, however, is broken in Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions. 41 RUTGERS
L. REV. - (forthcoming, 1989) (arguing that reliance on economic theory alone is not adequate to
guide policy concerning secured transactions, because it does not reflect common experience that
loans will not be collateralized).
141. RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE 87-88 (E. Altman & M. Subrahmanyam eds.
1985) (editors' introduction to Part 11); Litzenberger, Some Observations on CapitalStructure and
the Impact of Recent Recapitalizationson Share Prices. 21 3. F N. & QuANT. ANAL. 59, 60 (1986).
Furthermore, in a world of irrelevance, managers need not ponder financing decisions, since the
choice does not affect their firm's total value. Horrigan, supra note 139, at 99-100.
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information' 42 and absorb newly released information quickly. The capital asset pricing model asserts that risk caused by events unique to a firm
has no effect on the firm's value because investors can easily eliminate
that risk by diversifying their portfolios. The only risk that matters is the
volatility of the firm as a part of the market as a whole. 143 These theories
make many of the injuries and valuation problems addressed by corporate and securities law disappear. Even when the theory does not vitiate
a given problem, the possibility that investors will protect themselves by
diversifying makes the problem seem less acute. 144
Yet, these theories, like the irrelevance hypothesis, lack an institutional component They address only markets; 145 they do not explain
firms. The capital asset pricing model, carried to its logical conclusion,
even negates the firm's traditional entrepreneurial function: since only
market risk carries rewards, managers should not bother to take unique
business risks.1 6 In these theories' world of complete self-protection,
many of the law's procedural and ethical concerns become inexplicable.
The theories, thus restricted, provide no basis for direct evaluation of the
structural assumptions and propositions of corporate law.
b. Agency theory and the option pricing modeL Agency theory
brings financial economics to the firm and the basic structures of corporate law. It models the firm as a "nexus of contracts" among factors of
production. The theory focuses almost exclusive attention on bilateral
contracting, 147 deconstructing the managerialist firm envisioned by Berle
142. Some commentators suggest that prices only partially reflect such information. See Gilson
& Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L REv. 549, 642 (1984) (analyzing
information flow as a market in itself, whose forces interact with those of capital markets to explain
efficiency of securities prices); Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19
U.C. DAvis L REv. 341, 401 (1986) (even if stock market is efficient in "information-arbitrage"

sense that it quickly reflects all available information, it might not be efficient in the "fundamentalvaluation" sense of reflecting discounted present value of rational expectations of future dividends).
143. Horrigan, supra note 139, at 102.
144. Proponents of these theories tend to claim that the theories have well-established empirical
backing. See, -& M. JENsN & C SMmIH, supra note 130, at 4. For a persuasive argument to the
contrary, see Whitley, supra note 130, at 175-76 (efficient-markets hypothesis is unfalsifiable because
it does not state what relevant information reflected in prices is, how it is identified, or how investors
use it; the capital asset pricing model's numerous tests are inconclusive).
145. A. Kaufman & L. Zacharias, supra note 134, at 2 n.3 ("Throughout the course of the
modem corporation's development, economists have-sought to develop a scientific basis for comparing the corporation's efficiency, as a means of organizing the allocation of resources .... with the
efficiency of the market.").
146. See Horrigan, supra note 139, at 102.
147. See Bratton, Nexus of Contracts AppraisaZ supra note 12 (Under the nexus-of-contracts
approach, "[the firm's separate characteristics are found to be insignificant, and determinant significance is attached to relationship's aggregate parts. This approach distills a contractual essence from
the corporation.").
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and Means. Agency theory also overcomes the irrelevance model's limiting assumptions, making possible the theoretical reconstruction of corporate institutions within the framework of neoclassical microeconomics.
The theory describes financial relationships in terms of agencies.
Suppliers of capital hire managers as their agents. Rational agents, who
retain some freedom to pursue their own ends, tend to shirk on the job
and behave in other opportunistic ways with respect to the capital invested. The theory, breaking with the irrelevance hypothesis, relaxes the
assumption of perfect information; information asymmetries prevent
market self-protection from curing all conflicts of interest. These failures
of self-protection give rise to "agency costs." Contracting can reduce
these costs and increase a firm's value. 148 Indeed, the contractual devices
149
that make up complex capital structures exist to control agency costs.
Their asserted positive effect on firm value rebuts the irrelevance
hypothesis.
Agency theory does not, however, deny the efficacy of self-protection by market trading and other simple purchase-and-sale arrangements. 15° The theory recognizes two market solutions in particular:

portfolio diversification 51 and unification-ownership of a fraction of
each of the outstanding ownership interests in a firm corresponding to
that interest's fraction of the whole.' 5 2 But agency theory asserts that
53
these devices cannot completely solve conflict-of-interest problems.'
Complex financial contracting results. But cost-reductive capital structures turn out to create their own conflict-of-interest problems among
148. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm. ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and Own.
ership Structure 3 J. FiN. ECON. 305, 333 (1976). This analysis rebuts the assertion of irrelevance
theory that tax and bankruptcy considerations provide a complete explanation for the connection
between capital structure and firm value. Kg., Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, The Economics of Leveraged Takeovers. 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 163, 177-78 (1987) (variation in optimal debt-equity ratios presumably arises from differing tax advantages and expected bankruptcy costs). The upshot of this
agency costs analysis is that different industry groups may have different optimal capital structures.
Jensen and Meckling suggest that higher debt-equity ratios will appear where management has only
minimal freedom to manipulate a firm's asset base, as with utilities. Jensen & Meckling, supra, at
355.
149. See A. BARNEA, R. HAUGEN & L. SENBET, supra note 139, at 2 (process of resolving
agency problems gives rise to complex financial instruments); Carney, supra note 140, at 4-5.
150. Sea eg., A. BARNEA, RL HAUGEN & L. SENBET, supra note 139, at 63, 65-66 (describing
"informal reorganization," a capital structure adjustment recommended for firms in trouble).
151. See Carney, supra note 140, at 61-62.
152. A. BARNEA, R. HAUGEN & L. SENBET, supra note 139, at 63-64.
153. Id. at 104. Carney details the real-world limitations. Diversification creates its own agency
costs and involves transaction costs. Unification underestimates the diverse risk preferences of investors and involves continuing costs of adjustment to the fractional portfolio. See Carney, supra note
140, at 11-19.
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securityholders. 15 4 These problems, in turn, encourage further diversification, unification, and complex contracting.
Agency theory asserts that three distinct costs determine the structure of debt-equity relationships: asset substitution, underinvestment,
and bankruptcy. 155 "Asset substitution" follows from the Black-Scholes
option pricing model, a fifth tenet of financial economics.1 56 That model
reinterprets equities as combinations of options to buy and sell a firm's
assets. Stockholders, in effect, hold an option to buy back the firm from
bondholders. The value of stock, viewed as an option, increases with the
volatility of the firm's earnings. 157 Thus, given borrowing, stockholders

want the firm to invest in high-variance projects, even projects less valuable to the firm as a whole than substitute projects with lower variance.
"Underinvestment" costs arise when the firm's ability to repay its debt
depends on the returns from future investments. If underinvestment obtains, stockholders confronted with an investment decision want the firm
to invest only in projects with a value that exceeds the cost of the project
plus the face value of the debt. Otherwise, the firm exerts itself solely for
its creditors' benefit. Given limited liability, stockholders might as well
walk away in that event, even when the foregone investment is "profitable." 1 58 'Bankruptcy costs" include the out-of-pocket and other costs
of corporate reorganization. Agency theory views bankruptcy proceedings as a result of contract failure. Perfect financial contracts, if anyone
could draft them, would establish reorganization bargains in advance.15 9
Agency theorists assert that bankruptcy costs are not as high as popu-

larly assumed. 16
154. These include the entire range of disputes that arise among securityholders of a given
firm--conflicts between stockholders and bondholders, between preferred and common stockholders, between senior and junior creditors, and so forth.
155. These costs are in addition to ancillary costs of monitoring and bonding. See Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 148, at 337-38. If monitoring were costless, firms could more effectively control the three central agency costs. Malitz, On FinancialContracting: The Determinantsof Bond
Covenants, FIN. MoMT., Summer 1986,at 18, 20.
156. See Black & Scholes, The Pricingof Optionsand CorporateLiabilities 813. POL.ECON. 637

(1973).
157. A- BARNA, B. HAUGEN & L. SENBET, supra note 139, at 33-34; see Horrigan, supra note
139, at 98.
158. See A. BAtNEA, L HAuGEN & L. SNmBET, supra note 139, at 35-37 (given debt outstanding, stockholders maximize their wealth by accepting an investment only if its market value exceeds
the debt obligation); Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 . FIN. EcoN. 147, 164-65
(1977); see also Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, supra note 148, at 177 (stockholders might forgo profitable
projects when cash flows from such projects are insufficient to retire maturing debt).
159. A. BARNEA, R. HAUGEN & L. SENBET, supra note 139, at 35.
160. The universal citation is Warner, Bankruptcy Cost" Some Evidence 32 J.FIN. 337 (1977),
a study of I I railroad bankruptcies between 1930 and 1955. Warner concluded that a bankruptcy
costs an average of 2.5% of firm value during the three years preceding the bankruptcy. Id. at 343.
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Asset substitution, underinvestment, and bankruptcy become more
problematic, and generate larger and larger agency costs, as a firm's leverage increases. 16 1 Similarly, risks of these costs under an individual loan
loom larger as the loan's term becomes longer. 162 The agency costs of
63
debt, then, are the costs of financial distress.
161. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 148, at 342 (agency costs of debt include opportunity
wealth loss caused by effect of debt on investment decisions and bankruptcy costs). Compare Gavish
& Kalay, On the Asset Substitution Problem 18 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAi. 21 (1983) (increases in
stockholder wealth do not depend monotonically on leverage ratio) with Green & Talmor, Asset
Substitution and the Agency Costs ofDebt Financing 10 J. BANKING & FIN. 391 (1986) (presenting
model in support of notion that increased debt heightens stockholders' incentives to take risk). For
discussions of asset substitution in the legal literature, see Barkey, The FinancialArticulation of a
FiduciaryDuty to Bondholders with FiduciaryDuties to Stockholders ofthe Corporation. 20 CREIGHTON L Rnv. 47, 51-52 (1986) (discussing the Black-Scholes model); Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercialand CorporateSettings; 92 YALE LJ. 49, 66-68 (1982) (discussing the JensenMeckling model).
162. Carney, supra note 140, at 63; Klein, supra note 32, at 1561.
163. Malitz, supranote 155, at 20. Scholarship under the agency paradigm combines analysis of
incentives and the bargaining dynamic to explain the provisions, devices, and patterns of debt contracting. Inquiry focuses on the debt contract most problematic from the agency-cost perspective,
the long term unsecured loan. Private placements, that is, long-term debt contracts that closely
constrain debtors' conduct, are made by riskier borrowers. These borrowers generate higher agency
costs and have more of an incentive to reduce these costs by contract. In contrast, public debt
offerings by better creditors reflect few such constraints. Id; see also Smith & Warner, On Financial
Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcoN. 117, 150 (1979) (private placements
generally contain more restrictions than do public issues).
Commentators have explained each of the standard business covenants in agency-cost terms.
For example, prohibitions on excess investment in marketable securities deter asset substitution, and
limitations of dividends to amounts" earned or raised through issues of new equity inhibit underinvestment by forcing firms to maintain the asset base. Id at 125-26, 131-35; Malitz, supra note 155,
at 19; see also Handjinicolaou & Kalay, Wealth Redistributions or Changes in Firm Value: An
Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders Around Dividend Announcements 13 J. FIN.
ECON. 35, 57, 59 (1984) (announcements of dividend reductions signal unexpected reductions of
future cash flows, and cause losses to bondholders, who will share decreases in firm value with
stockholders).
Easterbrook's work in agency theory puts this debtor-creditor picture in the larger context of
management-stockholder relations. Management's undiversifable investment in human capital
causes risk aversion regarding debt burdens; this risk aversion causes conflict with stockholders'
interests. Wealth transfers from stockholders to bondholders are hypothesized: the bondholders
buy bonds with the understanding that management will act in the stockholders' interest, but man.
agement instead pursues its own interest, causing the agency cost of the debt to be less than the
bondholders anticipated. Following this reasoning, Easterbrook explains steady dividends to the
stockholders as devices that force management to eschew conservative retained earnings financing
and to keep the debt-equity ratio higher than management's self-interest would dictate. The outflows of cash also force management to go to the capital markets for financing, which results in
monitoring that benefits the stockholders. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends; 74 AM. ECoN. REv. 650, 653-54 (1984). Easterbrook's model, however, is flawed. Market
experience in the 1970s made bondholders unlikely to price issues on the assumption that management would maximize the value of the firm to the stockholders. On the contrary, bondholders
bought issues from the better credits on the assumption that self-interested management behavior
would obviate the need for business covenants. See infra text accompanying notes 213-14.
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Thus, the agency conception of debtor-creditor relationships focuses
on the same scenarios as do the traditional and investment conceptionsdistress situations. But agency theory describes a different pattern of distress. On the one hand, it depicts debt and equity interests in sharper
conflict than previously supposed. This intensified conflict stems from
the option pricing model's switch of the source of equity value from expected return to volatility. 164 On the other hand, agency theory breaks
new ground in minimizing the practical import of such conflicts of interest. The agency model's rational economic actors forecast agency
problems and form unbiased expectations regarding their impact.1 5

Creditors anticipate debtors' self-interested behavior and adjust loan
charges accordingly. As a result, debtors bear the agency costs and have
an incentive to offer contract provisions to eliminate this pricing effect. 1'
2. Rebuttals of Received Legal Theory. The agency theorists'
view of the corporation deconstructs and rebuts both traditional and in-

vestment-based legal theory.
a

Rebuttal of the traditional conception.

In the "nexus-of-

contracts" firm, all factors of production come to the firm on an equal
footing. Contracting settles details of the various interestholders' partici-

pations in the firm. Equity loses its property-based identity with the
firm;167 its participation is restated in contractual terms. Furthermore,
agency theory extends the investment conception's association of debt
and equity to a point of conceptual identity.16 8 Creditors' and stockhold169
ers' "contractual" participations differ in details, but not in essence.

164. Agency theory thus partly rebuts the managerialist assertion that stockholders and bondholders have common interests. See ag., Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance. and Takeoper, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 323, 323-24 (1986).
165. A. BARNEA, B. HAUrEN & L. SENBET, supra note 139, at 25-26.
166. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 148, at 345. This point is disputed. Compare Barnea, Haugen & Senbet, An Equilibrium Analysis of Debt Financing Under Costly Tax Arbitrage andAgehcy
Problems, 36 J. FmN. 569, 579 (1981) (bondholders bear costs) with Roberts & Viscione, Note on Who
Pays the Agency Costs of Debt, 19 FIN. REv. 232 (1984) (lenders and borrowers share costs; both
groups benefit from cost reduction).
167. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
169. Different commentators describe this conflation of equity and debt variously. One author
joins equity and debt as different forms of "ownership," see Carney, supra note 140, at 60-61, another as different forms of "loans," see Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, supra note 148, at 172-73. See also
Anthony, supra note 36, at 246 (arguing that financial economic conception of firm should be assimilated into accounting-an approach that would displace historic proprietary theory and result in
accounting for equity as a cost); Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Cosm 38
STAN. L. Rav. 271, 274 n.8 (1986) (no fundamental difference between equity and debt from an
economic perspective). However, one of the new works in the field, Grossman & Hart, The Cost and
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical andLateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986), at
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The agency model deconstructs the management corporation by focusing all attention on individual actors and their bilateral contracts. It
breaks the managerialist reification of the corporate debt-equity relationship, 170 returning us to a world of individual debtors and creditors. But
it does not thereby revive the contracting dynamic of the traditional conception. The rational economic actors who populate agency theory are
creatures of academic models rather than holistically modeled actors
drawn from history. Their relentless rational behavior precludes the fear
and moralism traditionally attached to financial distress. High debtequity ratios are not the product of questionable, risk-prone behavior.
And bankruptcy no longer appears as the product of failure, with moral
implications.17 1
b. Rebuttal of the investment conception. Agency theory also rebuts the investment conception, by "securitizing" debt investments.
Debtholders treat the same bonds, debentures, and notes differently
under agency theory. They do not expect to hold this debt for twenty
years; they consider exit by market sale a constant possibility.
The investment conception does not deny that investors trade, of
course. But its debt-equity picture does not highlight trading; instead, it
centers on the managerialist corporate entity. Under managerialism, individuals tend not to matter except as members of groups; only groups
enjoy cognizable power and interests. Bondholders thus are depicted as a
group, instead of as individuals trading in a marketplace. The bondholder group's capital is sunk in the corporate debtor, rather than retrievable through the sale of a security. Moreover, management exercises
power over the capital invested. In the agency conception, in contrast,
management does not exercise power over investors by virtue of its special position in the production process; it is just another contracting
72
party in the nexus.'
3.

The Normative Implications of Agency Theory.

a. The contractual hierarchy. Financial economists bring individualist values to their models. They prefer people to be free-standing
and independent. For this reason, they consider the best contracts to be
least holds out the prospect of a return to an association of equity and ownership. Grossman and
Hart identify ownership of an asset with possession of residual rights of control over the asset and
suggest that in a world of complete contracts, there is an optimal allocation of residual rights of
control. Id. at 692.
170. See supra text accompanying note 19.
171. See Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, supra note 148, at 174-75. (conceiving bankruptcy as a contractual problem caused by a shortfall of cash).
172. See Bratton, Nexus of ContractsAppraisal supra note 12.
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discrete contracts, that is, impersonal arm's-length exchanges that objec-

tify all aspects of a relationship into concrete terms, particularly the
price. These economists consider relational contracts--exchanges that
do not objectify all matters ex ante and entail future contact between the
parties, along with their subjective interaction-appropriate only as costavoiding backstops.17 3
These values have positive and normative ramifications. The positive assertion is that rational actors resort to discrete contracts first, turning to complex, relational contracts only when discrete market solutions
generate unnecessary costs. The normative assertion is that parties
should not expose themselves to agency costs avoidable by contract and
should explore discrete solutions first. These two assertions imply a preference hierarchy among the contracting devices that shape corporate relationships. Diversification and unification constitute the most discrete
devices, since investors can unilaterally use them in the marketplace. Financial ecomomic models therefore predict that those devices will
predominate; the models fault parties who pass up self-protective
opportunities.
As applied to debt contracts, these models predict that complex contracts will appear only when the last-ditch discrete device, the price,
leaves a party bearing unnecessary agency costs.174 This point occurs
when a loan's long term makes financial distress an unavoidable contracting contingency. A normative result, readily transferable to legal
doctrine, parallels this prediction. The norm is a presumption against
the existence of legally cognizable noncontractual injuries between corporate debtors and creditors.
b. Financialeconomics at variouspoints in the hierarchy-neoclassical and institutionalmodels and their respective implicationsfor legal
theory. Although economists tend to subscribe to the values just discussed, they differ in their applications of them, modeling corporate relationships at different places in the contractual hierarchy. Some assume
that discrete contracting solves all problems. Others argue that fidelity
to real world conditions requires abandonment of this assumption; these
economists' models occupy lower rungs. Generally, as a model admits
more contract failure and moves down the ladder, (a) the parties' con173. See supra notes 13941, 150-54, and accompanying text; infra notes 175-77 and accompany-

ing tex.
174. Significantly, the irrelevance school of financial economics does not attempt to introduce
complex contracts or agency costs into its model. With assumptions of perfect markets and full
information, it models debt and equity in a completely discrete world. See supra notes 139-41 and

accompanying text.
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tracts become more relational, (b) corporate structures become more
complex, (c) possibilities for legally cognizable injury intensify, (d) the
model becomes less neoclassical and more institutional, and (e) the
model more closely resembles the received legal model.
L Neoclassical models. Economists who make neoclassical assumptions analyze corporate structure largely in terms of discrete contracts. They account for the differences in the legal incidents of debt and
equity by associating equity control with residual risk. Although debt
and equity start as common factors of production, equity, as the residual
risk-bearer, has greater incentives to monitor and reduce production
costs. This approach reaffirms the status quo: the traditional legal structure, which accords stockholders the vote and makes debt "contractual,"
turns out to be efficient.1 75
Cruder neoclassical models go a step further and emphasize stockholders' opportunities for self-protection through discrete contracting.
These models challenge the legal status quo for overstating corporate fiduciary duties: market actors do not want all the legal protection they
currently get; they prefer discrete devices like diversification and market
exit. 7 6 The law also overstates duties responding to the moral hazard of
risky investments by highly distressed, leveraged firms: since creditors
can easily protect themselves and often do, they can incur no legally cog7
nizable injury.17
iL Institutionalmodels. Economists writing in the opposing, institutional tradition abandon the focus on the discrete contract, instead
modeling corporations as ongoing relationships. 178 In their view, market
self-protection never works perfectly, opening up possibilities for one individual's or group's appropriation of capital from another. Various firm
participants face various risks of expropriation. Equityholders bear the
greatest risk because they hold the residual claim. Even as equityholders
175. Fama & Jensen,Separationof Ownership and Control 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 303 (1983); see
Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 401-402 (1983) (corporate

structure facilitates benefits of division of labor); Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual
Claims; 26 J.L. & EcON. 327, 328 (1983) (residual risk borne by those who contract for rights to net

cash flows).
176. The most famous work in this genre is Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982).
177. See Easterbrook & Fisohel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. Rav. 89,
104-06 (1986).
178. See generally 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) (adopting economic perspective based on institutional models); Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON.
Lrr. 1537 (1981) (analyzing modern corporate form as series of organizational innovations).
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respond by diversifying, the law enhances their position by providing for
179
voting control and imposing fiduciary duties on managers.
This analysis of equity can extend to long-term unsecured debt.
With high debt-equity ratios, even well-protected debt becomes vulnerable to expropriation. The institutionalists acknowledge this point, but
step back from the implication that debtholders should receive voting
power and fiduciary protection, citing the availability of protective contracting. 8 0 But this step back does not eliminate the extension, which
opens the possibility of legal protection. If contract failure can be
demonstrated, the institutional analysis provides a theoretical justification for legal protection of creditors. 1' 8
ii Connections with the traditional and investment conceptions.
Norms that shape the neoclassical version of the agency conception tend
to resemble those that shape the traditional conception. Enmity and self-

protection dominate both. Injuries need not result in intervention under
either. And, prior to insolvency, with its well-defined legal implications,

neither leaves much of a role for the law, other than to make contracts
enforceable.

The institutional rendering of the agency conception contradicts this
simple picture. By abandoning fidelity to the discrete contract, and
stressing the dangers attending long-term investments, it opens the possibility of legally cognizable injury. But even as the institutionalists reconstruct aspects of the investment conception, they do not deny the
relevance of self-protection by market means. Nor do they make a normative commitment to recognize injury to debtholders in every case of
issuer opportunism. In effect, then, they revisit the juxtaposition of the
traditional and investment conceptions in postwar legal theory, combining their ambivalent elements under the aegis of one theory.
179. See Carney, supra note 140, at 64 (investors reserve decisionmaking rights); Williamson,

CorporateGoyernance, 93 YALE L. 1197, 1204-12 (1984) (analyzing net gains to corporate constituencies from representation by board of directors).

180. Carney, supra note 140, at 66-67; see Williamson, supra note 179, at 1211-12 (lenders deserve board representation in atypical circumstances). The approach of Oliver Williamson, the lead-

ing institutionalist, exemplifies the extension and the step back. Extending, he notes the
vulnerability caused by high debt-equity ratios. Stepping back, he notes that, in practice,
debtholders begin to intervene at this stage through management consultation. Id; see also Klein,
supra note 32, at 1562 (as investment's duration lengthens, number of contingencies increases and
capacity to deal with them diminishes; solution is to distribute power among all long-term investors);
Levmore, supra note 161, at 80-82 (exploring implications of economic similarity of debt and equity
interests in context of creditor derivative suits).
181. See McDaniel, Bondholders I1 supra note 10, at 245-51.
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F. Summary
The traditional, investment, and agency conceptions offer different
and limiting models of the bondholder. Each model actor has a distinctive behavior pattern, and each behavior pattern has normative implications. Selecting a model actor charts a particular direction for normative
responses to debtor-creditor conflicts.
But none of the models suffices for all purposes, because in practice,
there is no quintessential bondholder. Real bondholders act in ways materially more complex than those depicted in any of the three models.
Today, a variety of investors hold corporate bonds. Some are large entities and individuals occupying positions of power with respect to their
debtors; others are large institutions with diversified portfolios; still
others are largely uninfluential and undefended individuals. The same
variety of actors hold corporate equities; many hold portfolios of equity
and debt. As inflation and other economic forces shift, these actors
weight and reweight their debt-equity portfolios.' t 2 Some holders treat
their debt and equity holdings as discrete contracts; indeed, given securitization, this has become common practice. Even so, some holders stay
more involved with their investments. Relationally conceived and structured corporate debt remains a practical possibility.
Because there is no single bondholder, and because corporate law
tends to be sensitive to the contingencies that result, no one model of the
bondholder has taken an exclusive hold on legal doctrine. The three
8 3
debt-equity conceptions coexist in the law.'
By accepting the conceptions' coexistence, we sanction contradiction in the law. But we do not thereby accept incoherence or introduce
additional indeterminacy. There is no single bondholder, but there are
bond contracts. Contract texts give the debt-equity relationship an objective center of gravity and formal integrity. They allow us to defer the
selection of an imperfect model actor to the secondary plane of textual
interpretation. At that level, the conceptions compete to shape the interpretation of the texts. 184 Significantly, the texts are sufficiently comprehensive to limit the permitted range of normative interpolation. Thus, in
182. McDaniel, Bondholders I supra note 10, at 417.
183. The agency conception has particular relevance to the determination of contemporary legal
issues. It has close ties to the forces that have changed the markets during recent years. Therefore,
it joins the still-ascendant traditional conception as a determining influence in the law. The two
coexist with little friction, complementing and reinforcing one another in most situations. At the
same time, the investment conception has lost force. The practical developments that make agency
ideas influential undercut the investment conception's assumptions. Today's self-protected investors
are less dependent on management discretion and probity.
184. See generally Bratton, Interpretation,supra note 10.
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practice, the law's imperfect model bondholders play interstitial roles.
They play leading roles only in theory.
This distinction between the function of texts and the function of
models explains the present state of corporate debtor-creditor doctrine.
In particular, it explains the traditional conception's persistence: that
conception protects the texts of debt instruments and the associated contract-based interpretive model from the more personalized and tortoriented legal model used for other corporate relationships. So long as
this protective instinct dominates lawmaking, neither the investment
conception nor the agency conception can come to dominate the law. 18 5
At the same time, these conceptions function as supplements, ensuring
that the law recognizes relational elements omitted in the traditional
conception.
H.

CONCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE DEBT, BONDHOLDER WEALTH

TRANSFERS, AND IGH DEBT-EQurrY RATIOS

Restructurings disrupt the postwar pattern of relations among management, equity, and long-term debt interests. They realign power, causing management and debt to suffer while equity gains.
Recapitalizations are the means to the end of restructuring. They
come in several transactional modes: friendly mergers, hostile tender offers followed by mergers, leveraged buyouts, and defensive recapitalizations. Whatever the mode, recapitalizations entail the payment of a
bonus to equityholders, financed by substantial borrowing.18 6 The new
borrowing injures existing bondholders: in effect, it transfers value from
their securities to the equity's premium. Beginning in 1985, when large
corporations began to undergo restructurings, these wealth transfers
made bondholder protection a prominent legal policy question for the
first time since the Depression era. Another aspect of the restructuring
movement, the incidence of higher corporate debt-equity ratios, also has
prompted new policy discussions. This part of the Article considers re185. The traditional approach gives the text primacy over the managerialist assertion of investor
dependence. This view resonates with the broader relationship between managers and debtholders:
the text gives the debt investor a reservoir of power for times of financial distress. Since the traditional approach is constitutive and text-based, it stands apart from the contractualism of the agency
approach, which is behavioral, instrumental, and based on economic theory. Just as the continuing
presence of contract texts has prevented debt-equity relations from collapsing into the managerialist
model of the corporation, there to be manipulated for the policy objectives of one or another group,
so texts prevent a collapse into the agency model.
186. Corporations also finance such a bonus by selling their assets. This tends to occur in connection with, but subsequent to, borrowing: a corporation borrows capital to finance the bonus to
the equity and pays down the loan by subsequent asset sales.
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structuring-related wealth transfers, the new debt-equity ratios, and the
legal responses to them.
A. Bondholder Wealth Transfers
The three conceptions of debt-equity relationships discussed in part
I suggest normative responses to the restructuring-related wealth transfers. Each response shapes events to fit the informing conception. Each
therefore has a plausible empirical basis even though it fails to reflect the
entire picture of events. Nothing inherent in wealth transfers dictates
that any one of the three conceptions be applied to the exclusion of the
other two. Thus, none of the responses achieves indisputable theoretical

validity.
The legal result, however, is not in doubt. The traditional conception holds. It approves wealth transfers and encourages restructuring
transactions, but only up to the insolvency threshold. Near the insolvency line, it constrains restructurings that involve unacceptably high
leverage.
The first subsection that follows describes the wealth transfers and
the contracting practices that permit them. The second subsection evaluates the legal responses. The third subsection takes up a special set of
legal responses-applications of fraudulent conveyance law to leveraged
buyouts that skirt insolvency. The fourth and last subsection describes
market responses.
1. Restructuring and Bondholder Wealth Transfers
a Incidence and magnitude Restructurings began when players
in the capital markets lost their tolerance for corporate investment policies keyed to management's preferences.18 7 Restructuring transactions
undo the effects of suboptimal investment practices, returning suboptimally invested capital to equityholders. 188
High debt-equity ratios serve the restructuring objective in several
ways. New borrowing finances the initial return of capital to the equity.
Given an antecedent capital structure shaped by risk-averse managers,
187. Restructurings dissolve the implicit agreement between management and the capital markets concerning corporate investment power. The investment community used to accept management's pursuit of corporate "growth" passively. Managers were left alone because they had special
expertise in investment policy. This idea held despite the fact that managers' personal needs for
institutional security often led to investments at risk levels lower than stockholders' interests would
dictate. Even if a corporation's management made manifestly suboptimal investments, the costeffective stockholder response was to sell, rather than to attempt to challenge management directly
in order to force changed policies.
188. See Bratton, HistoricalPerspectives. supra note 29.
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new borrowing also raises the debt-equity ratio and lowers the corporation's overall cost of capital because of savings from the tax deductibility
of interest payments.189 The higher debt-equity ratio encourages management discipline in the future, because interest payments on debt are
mandatory, while dividends on stock are discretionary. The heavy debt
load forces management periodically to return substantial capital to the
investment community. No extra capital is left for suboptimal
investment.19o
The "wealth transfers," therefore, are incident to a wider shift in
corporate debt-equity relations. The transfers occur prior to or at the
start of a restructuring. They victimize the holders of the restructured
corporation's long-term, unsecured debt securities. To use agency language, leverage incident to restructuring increases these debtholders'
agency costs. To use plainer language, the preexisting debt becomes riskier and falls in price as the issuer's debt-equity ratio rises.
Restructuring first jeopardized the bonds of large corporations in
1995. It brought sudden price drops and concomitant downgradings of
formerly high grade bonds. The Unocal and Phillips Petroleum transactions were the most notorious. In each case, the restructured company's
bond rating fell from AA to BBB. 191 In another famous case, an issuer's
announcement of a one time special dividend as a defensive move caused
its bonds to drop $200 in value. 192 Even rumors of a tender offer can
189. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1988).
190. Jensen, supra note 164, at 323-24. In Jensen's parlance, the substitution of interest payments for dividends "bonds" the promise to pay out future cash flows. Of course, the higher debtequity ratio results in higher agency costs for debt. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
Ironically, heavy indebtedness might make management less risk-averse. Managers anxious to
lessen risk by paying down debt may be enticed by the big pay off held out by a risky investment.
Coffee, Stockholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 62,
65-66 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Corporate Web]. In Coffee's parlance, a higher debt-equity ratio
pushes up managers' "aspiration level." Id at 65.
The "management-disciplinary" explanation of the restructuring movement is a reduction. It
suffices for present purposes, subject to the caveat that the real world is more complex. See Coffee,
The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders; Stakeholders and Bust-Ups
1988 Ws. L REv. 435, 441-43 hereinafter Coffee, Takeover Reform].
191. Farrell, Takeovers and Buyouts Clobber Blue-Chip Bondholders; Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1985,
at 113.
192. McDaniel, Bondholders II, supra note 10, at 209 (Colt Industries). The wealth transfer
effect occurs as an incident of each of the major modes of restructuring: leveraged buyouts (Macy's
announcement of a leveraged buyout caused its stock to go up $16 and its notes to drop 3 points),
hostile tender offers followed by mergers (Unocal's and Phillips Petroleum's bond ratings fell from
AA to BBB after firms took on debt to deter corporate raiders), defensive restructurings (CBS's AArated bonds dropped 4 points upon the announcement of an exchange of new debt for old equity in
reponse to Ted Turner's tender offer), friendly mergers (the merger of ABC and Capital Cities
caused the credit ratings of both to drop; 11.75% debentures of Capital Cities traded at 85 basis
points above Treasury bills prior to the merger and traded at 125 basis points above Treasury bills
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cause bonds to fall 193 The phenomenon continues unabated, as the food
company restructurings of fall 1988 demonstrate. 194
Since 1985, downgradings because of the risk of restructuringcalled "event risk" by the bond-rating agencies-have become commonplace. Bond analysis no longer considers only corporate fundamentals
and the business cycle. 195 In 1986, downgrades at Standard & Poor's
exceeded upgrades by a two-to-one ratio; one-third of these downgrades

related to restructurings. 196 In the same year the record number of industrial bond downgrades exceeded upgrades by 4.2 to 1.197 By mid1987, the median grade for an industrial bond was a speculative BB; in

1982 the median grade had been A. 195

Different observers make different assessments of the wealth trans-

fers' magnitude. If one focuses only on the bonds affected and their
prices before and after the events in question, the amounts transferred
seem impressive. Bond analysts point out that a one-grade drop from
AA to A causes a 5% to 6% drop in market value; a drop from A to B
causes a 15% to 20% drop in market value.199 The Unocal bondholders
alone lost the substantial sum of $170 million. If one shifts perspective to
look at each restructuring transaction as a whole, however, the quantum

of bondholder injury seems less impressive. The face value of two issues
of Unocal bonds declined only 4.2% and 3% respectively. 20 0 At the

same time, the Unocal stockholders received $2.8 billion. 2°1 Economic
studies generalize on this lesson. They recognize significant bondholder
after the merger). See Farrell, supra note 191, at 113; Prokesch, Merger Wave: How Stock and
Bonds Fare, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986, at Al, col. 1. For a discussion of the particular effects of
restructuring transactions on the value of convertible bonds' conversion privilege, see Boland, When
Bonds Lose their Convertibility, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1988, § 3, at 10, col. 2.
193. McDaniel, BondholdersII supra note 10, at 209.
194. Wallace, supra note 3, at DI, coL 3 (discussing RJR Nabisco buyout and its effect on
bondholders).
195. See McDaniel, Bondholders II, supra note 10, at 208 (Standard & Poor's Corp. lowered
bond ratings in response to corporate leveraging); Farrell, supra note 191, at 113 (rating agencies are
lowering rates on takeover targets' securities).
196. Robertson, Debenture Holders and the Indenture Trustee: ControllingManagerialDiscredon in the Solvent Enterprise, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 461, 471-72 (1988).
197. McDaniel, BondholdersII, supra note 10, at 208; see also Prokesch, supra note 192, at D4,
col. 2. Twenty-seven percent of these downgrades resulted from restructurings. Farrell, supra note
191, at 113. All this-more downgrades than in the recession year of 1982--took place during a bull
bond market.
198. McDaniel, BondholdersII, supra note 10, at 208.
199. Prokesch, supra note 192, at D4, col. 2.
200. Lehn, Blackwell & Mar', supra note 148, at 186-87.
201. Litzenberger has analyzed the Phillips and Unocal data in order to calculate the value
transferred from the bondholders to the stockholders. He found that the Phillips bondholders' loss
amounted to a gain of $0.25/share to Phillips stockholders; the Unocal stockholders gained $0.042/
share from their bondholders. Litzenberger, supra note 141, at 67, 69.
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losses in individual cases,2 02 but stress that the losses are on average so

small that stockholder gains outstrip them.20 3 The studies conclude that
the wealth transfer effect, while a real benefit to equityholders in restructurings, is not enough of a boon to drive the wider restructuring
2 o4

movement.

b. The facilitatingconditions" the disappearanceof business covenants and the limitedforce of reputation. Bondholders would not have

suffered wealth transfers if the contracts governing their bonds had contained restrictions against additional debt With covenants prohibiting

the transactions, those in control would have had to "take out" the bondholders by prepaying the old debt in order to take on new debt.205 Unfortunately for bondholders, by 1985 trust indentures governing the longterm unsecured debt of large corporations usually did not contain these

restrictions.
This practice reflected a change from earlier contracting patterns, a
change unnoticed in legal and economic commentary on debt contracts
202. E&g Taggart,supra note 135, at 19.
203. Lehn and Poulsen's study of leveraged buyouts finds an aggregate loss of 1.4% to nonconvertible bondholders and 2.5% to convertible bondholders. The study covers only 37 issues of
bonds, however. Lehn & Poulsen, Leveraged Buyouts: Wealth Createdor Wealth Redistributed?,in
PUBLIc Poucy TowARD CoRpomTE TAKEoVERs 46, 57-58 (M. Weidenbaum & K. Chilton eds.
1988). For criticism of this study, see McDaniel, Bondholders , supra note 10, at 211-12 (bondholders might have experienced significant losses before announcement of the LBOs at issue).
204. See Lehn & Poulsen, supra note 203, at 46-61; cf Masulis, The Impactof CapitalStructure
Change on Fi'm Value" Some Estimates, 38 J. FIN. 107, 116-18 (1983) (study of recapitalizations
involving increased leverage, 1963-1978, confirming wealth transfer effect). But cf Marais, Schipper
& Smith, Wealth Effects of Going Privatefor Senior Securities, 23 J. FIN. EcoN. - (forthcoming,
1989) (study of going-private buyout proposals made from 1974 to 1985 finds insignificant negative
returns to nonconvertible debt securities).
The financial economics literature includes a large number of studies on the wealth effects of
mergers and tender offers. So far as bondholder-to-stockholder wealth transfers are concerned, these
studies test two opposing models. One is the agency-costs model. Under this model, the stockholders of an acquiring firm have an incentive to increase the variability of their own firm's cash flow in
ways that injure its bondholders. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57. The opposing model,
the "coinsurance" theory, holds that the merger of two firms could create a portfolio effect that
would reduce the variability of the firms' combined cash flows, transferring wealth to the bondholders. See Dennis & McConnell, CorporateMergersand Security Returns, 16 J. FIN. EcoN. 143, 179
(1986). The studies show that stockholders of both acquired and acquiring corporations tend to gain
in mergers, but that bondholders of both types of corporations tend neither to gain nor to lose. See
eg, id at 184-85 (study showing that preferred stockholders of acquiring companies and preferred
stockholders and senior securityholders of acquired companies benefit, with minimal effect on other
equity interests). Because these studies cover merger activity only through 1980, they should not be
read to contradict the conclusions of empirical studies of the restructuring movement that began in
1985, discussed supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text.
205. When the debt of restructuring companies contains a debt covenant, the bondholders are
taken out. Robertson, supra note 196, at 482.
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until the wealth transfers highlighted it.2o6 For most of this century,
contracts governing long-term debt restricted subsequent substantial indebtedness, along with subsequent dividends and liens. 2°0 Until recently,
investors considered these provisions central to the bargain. They served
as a substitute for security, protecting debtholders' interest in issuer earning streams from issuer misbehavior 1 8 In financial economic terms, the
provisions insulated holders from agency costs. The degree of constraint

depended on each issuer's credit standing. Better credits with access to
public bond markets faced fewer restraints than smaller issuers making
private placements. The best credits issued debt with no restraints other
than a debt covenant.2 09
This pattern continued until the mid-1970s. 2 10 Since then, new public, unsecured debt of large industrials has tended to contain only a "negative pledge" against additional secured debt and a covenant prohibiting
the sale and leaseback of issuer assets. Debt and dividend covenants
have disappeared, surviving to restrain only smaller issuers. 211
When large restructurings commenced, the affected bondholders
lacked defenses, but did not seem to know their exposure. Apparently
everyone, except for the handful of lawyers and underwriters directly involved and perhaps a few traders and portfolio managers, thought that
debt contracts still took the traditional form, or at least supplied some
206. Morey McDaniel has pointed out this change in Bondholders I supra note 10, at 424-26.
207. See ag., ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 33, at 369-71, 402-04 (debt contracts nearly
always contain debt and dividend covenants); B. MANNING, supra note 38, at 96-106 (debt contracts
always contain debt covenants, dividend covenants, and covenants against competing and senior
claims); cf A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 122-23
(rev. ed. 1968) (discussing dividend covenants).
208. Garrett, supra note 55, at 680-81.
209. Simpson, The Drafting of Loan Agreementr A Borrower's Viewpoint 28 Bus. LAW. 1161,
1161-62 (1973). Smith and Ware's study of 87 public issues registered between January 1974 and
December 1975 shows that 90.8% had some prohibition on the issuance of additional debt. Interestingly, only 23% of the issues contained dividend restrictions. Smith & Warner, supra note 163, at
122-23. Evidently, the standard picture had already begun to change in 1974-1975.
210. See Prokesch, supra note 192, at D4, col. 2.
211. McDaniel surveyed the debt contracts of Fortune's 100 largest industrials in 1984. He
found that negative pledge and sale-leaseback covenants were ubiquitous. Of the 92 companies reported as having one or more senior issues, one or more subordinated issues, or both, only 28% of
the issues contined debt covenants. Of the newer issues, only 16% contained a debt covenant. Dividend restrictions appeared in 35% of the issues, but in only 20% of the newer issues. McDaniel,
Bondholders I, supra note 10, at 425-26.
Malitz surveyed all long-term senior nonconvertible debentures issued between 1960 and 1980
and described in Moody's Bond Survey or Moody's IndustrialManual Of these, 49% contained no
debt covenant. Malitz found a negative correlation between the presence of debt covenants and the
size of the issuer. Malitz, supra note 155, at 21-24.
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minimal protection. 21 2
The covenants had disappeared because they seemed unnecessary.
Before 1985, economic prosperity combined with management's dominant governance position to make large corporations look reliable as unsecured borrowers. 21 3 Whatever the turns of the business cycle,
management seemed unlikely to seek to benefit stockholders by abusing
bondholders. Management wanted growth and security-goals best realized with conservative leverage and retained-earnings financing. Moreover, managers had passed up opportunities to injure bondholders even
when debt contracts posed no obstacle. According to the conventional
wisdom, such opportunistic conduct would lead creditors in future
financings to impose unfavorable terms, the costs of which would out2 14
weigh the benefits of present wealth transfers.
21 5
The assumption that management held an unassailable position
ultimately led to questions about the need for covenants. Covenants became a subject of bargaining. 2 16 Management characterized covenants as
212. Legal and economic commentators certainly assumed that debt contracts were exhaustively
drafted. See, eg.. B. MANNING, supra note 38, at 96-97; Bratton, Interpretation.supra note 10, at
384; Easterbrook, supranote 163, at 655-56; see also M. JENSEN & C. SMITH, supra note 130, at 111
(covenants reduce agency costs and owners benefit in the form of a higher bond price); Asquith &
Kim, The Impact of Merger Bids on ParticipatingFirms' Security Holders, 37 J. FIN. 1209, 1226
(1982) (bondholders on average enjoy protection from potential wealth transfer through mergers;
they neither gain nor lose); Handjinicolaou & Kalay, supranote 163, at 59 (arguing that bondholders
pricing bonds will assume that allowable dividends will be paid; any lower dividend rate will transfer
wealth from stockholders to bondholders).
In the teeth of the last four years' experience, financial economists still assume that debt contracts contain elaborate and effective protections of bondholders' interests. See ,ag., Carney, supra
note 140, at 61-63; Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, supra note 148, at 175.
213. Between the Depression and the late 1970s, very little law relating to bonds was made,
presumably because bond contracting patterns, investors' expectations, and institutional practices
interrelated harmoniously. Reported cases tended to concern the conversion privilege, and even
these cases did not arise often until the merger movement heated up in the late 1970s and early
1980s. See generally Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 10, at 671, 693-98. The other factor
that led to friction-and gave management incentives for opportunism-was the rise in interest rates
after 1978. See, eg., Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (dispute stemming from redemption of high coupon debt); cf. Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983) (low
coupon rate explains management disincentive to redeem plaintiffs' bonds).
214. Taggart, supra note 135, at 19. John and Nachman have modeled reputation as a force that
curtails agency costs. Under this model, management reduces underinvestment without needing the
constraint of an explicit covenant; the authors call reputation an "implied contract." John & Nachman, Risky Debt, Investment Incentives, and Reputation in a Sequential Equilibrium, 40 J. FIN. 863,
870-76 (1985).
215. Coffee associates the disappearance of restrictive covenants with reliance on management's
position. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 190, at 68-69.
216. Tight, close-to-perfect sets of covenants, while easy enough to draft (private placement and
term loan forms contain them) never appeared in public debt contracts. The rigor of such covenants
might easily cause management to forgo a value-increasing transaction, while conferring no material
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2 17
an unnecessary and costly backstop for the bondholders' position.
Since the costs were real and the bondholders confident, management
won the point.

The restructuring movement has shattered the managerialist assumptions behind the covenantless debt contract. The financial markets
have proved that the manager-emperors had no clothes. Power over investment and financing has shifted to the capital markets. Corporate

reputation-the unprotected bondholders' backstop-has proved ineffective. Managers' and stockholders' incentives to maintain good reputations in the capital markets do not have the staying power of contract
promises; they shift along with power and money. Exiting stockholders
and managers care nothing about a corporate entity's future financing
costs. 2 18 Managers battling to stay on might indeed care, but have more
immediate problems. As Jensen and Meckling noted in 1976, and bondholders discovered in 1985, sainthood does not have infinite benefits, and
219
agency costs do not reduce to zero.

benefit on the bondholders. And, given a dispersed body ofbondholders, managers and bondholders
would find it hard to loosen tight covenants by contract amendment. Furthermore, the difficulty of
executing a binding amendment has created a holdout problem in times of financial stress. See Roe,
supra note 103, at 232, 236-39; see also McDaniel, BondholdersI, supra note 10, at 427-28 (discussing problems caused in Chrysler restructuring by negative pledge clause).
217. McDaniel accounts in part for the disappearance of covenants by noting that their value has
become dubious-a decline attributable to the reality that loopholes exploitable by good lawyers or
creative managers are inevitable. See McDaniel, Bondholders I, supra note 10, at 236-38; see also
Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 190, at 69 (theorizing that use of covenants has declined because
no covenant could cover all of the ways that management can increase bondholders' risk). But this
contracting problem, often obscured in the discussion, is not impossible to address effectively, even
though contract perfection is unattainable. Any junior associate can draft a set of showstopping
covenants. The basic elements of restructuring--borrowing, security, dividends and other payments
to stockholders, and mergers and sales of assets-are the bread and butter of traditional business
covenants. The problem stems from drafters' inability to foresee the future. If drafters could overcome this problem, they could impede precise injurious potential transactions without constraining
management in other legitimate activity. Since the drafters cannot foresee the future, effective protections are necessarily overinclusive. This overinclusiveness has costs.
Today, given several years of experience with restructuring-related wealth transfers, one could
easily draft a covenant that would permit a restructuring to go forward and would not injure bondholders. Such a covenant would tie a change in the interest rate to stated increases in the issuer's
debt-equity ratio. See Wallae, supra note 3, at D5, col. 3 (bondholders seeking to protect investments by using covenants that increase interest rates on buyout or restructuring).
218. Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the DelawareSupreme Court,
72 CORNELL L. REv. 117, 139-40 (1986) ("[Tendering stockholders may seek to maximize their
exit payout at the expense of these other constituencies. Stockholders will leap at a premium price
and transfer control to a bidder even if they realize that the new owner will default on corporate
obligations to nonstockholders."); see Leebron, Games CorporationsPlay: A Theory of Tender Offin 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 153, 203 n.169 (1986) (usual reputational constraint against exploitation of
bondholders does not apply in tender offer context).
219. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 148, at 351.
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2. Legal Response& The three conceptions of corporate debt
shape law and commentary 220 on restructuring-related wealth transfers,
as the following discussion shows.
a. The traditionalconception. As we have seen, the traditional
model remits a creditor seeking recourse against a solvent debtor to contract.22 1 Under this conception, wealth transfers incident to restructurings that do not bring the debtor near insolvency create no right of action
absent a covenant. At or near the insolvency line, however, payments to
stockholders and new creditors can amount to fraudulent conveyances.
Corporate law reinforces this result by giving management substantial discretion over bondholder relations. 222 The discretion works both
ways: within broad limits, management may either benefit or injure
bondholders. As long as it can show some rational connection to corporate profit and stockholder gain, 2 2 3 management may not only effect
wealth transfers, but may forgo them. 224 It also has discretion to maintain debt-equity ratios and other aspects of financial structure that benefit
itself and its bondholders but are suboptimal from the stockholders'
covenants, including covepoint of view. 225 And it may accept business
226
offers.
tender
hostile
nants that deter
The Delaware courts consistently apply these principles. In a recent
case, the Chancery Court noted bondholders' restructuring-related injuries, but applied the traditional conception: no right absent an indenture
220. No injured bondholder's lawsuit challenging a wealth transfer has yet prompted an appellate opinion, nor have bondholdex wealth transfers figured into congressional policy discussions regarding corporate indebtedness in connection with restructurings. However, various legislative
proposals would discourage the issuance and holding of junk bonds. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, U.S. CONGRESS, CORPORATE MERGERS AND HIGH YIELD
[JUNK] BONDS: RECENT MARKET TRENDS AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 3 (1986) [herein-

after CRS, RECENT TRENDS].
221. See supra text accompanying note 33.
222. This response is a combination of the corporate-law principle that management has a primary duty to stockholders, see, eg., Oesterle, supra note 218, at 138-40 (analyzing management
representation of stockholder and nonstockholder interests in context of wealth transfers), and the
business judgment rule which curtails judicial review of management decisionmaking.
223. RESTATEMENT OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 34, § 2.01 (objective and conduct of the
corporation).
224. In the latter case it would presumably justify its action by asserting that the corporation's
market reputation would benefit.
225. See generally G. DONALDSON, MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH: THE OPERATION OF A
COMPREHENSIVE FINANCIAL GOALS SYSTEM 42-57 (1984) (discussing corporate finance from management perspective).
226. Cf Fox v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 137 Cal. App. 3d 524, 187 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1982)
(sustaining spin-off of 50% of debtor corporation; courts will not take cognizance of bondholders'
interest in market value of their investments).
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provision or legislative intervention. In the landmark Revlon case, 2 2 7 the
Delaware Supreme Court constrained management's discretion to take
defensive action benefiting bondholders in the context of a tender offer
defense that involved the breakup of the target. Presumably, the business
judgment rule still applies to other bondholder-beneficial management
actions.
b. The agency conception. Agency theory also sanctions the
wealth transfers. Commentators articulate three variations of the theory-strong, intermediate, and weak. The strong mode sanctions the
wealth transfers by applying a positive model of the place of debt in corporate structures. The intermediate mode lacks this positive certitude.
Instead, it sanctions the wealth transfers on a normative level, drawing
on agency theory's individualistic rules of investor self-protection. The
weak mode falls outside the standard law and economics pattern; it declines to accord agency theory primary positive or normative force. Even
so, the weak mode uses elements of financial economics, sometimes giving them determinative weight.
In its strong mode, agency theory combines a strong version of the
efficient-market hypothesis with Jensen and Meckling's original agency
model. A clear, positive picture results-wealth transfers do not raise a
legal issue because the bondholders suffer no injury in the first place.
When rational economic actors price bonds, they discount for the risk of
expropriation. The market price impounds this expropriation discount.
The bondholders in effect have been paid to bear the risk.228
The intermediate mode makes two modifications. First, it abandons
the assumption that bondholders price debt based on the risk of wealth
transfers. Bond prices thus lose determinative force. This modification
carries us back to the pre-1985 world, in which no one had conceived of
corporate restructurings. Of course, even before 1985, the rational economic actor of the neoclassical models still would have discounted for
the theoretical risk of expropriation. In the intermediate mode, however,
the institutional economists' actor, with his bounded rationality, holds
the stage. 229 More closely resembling a real-world bondholder, this investor does not discount the bonds for unheard of future risk. The inter227. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); see supra
note 113.
228. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 62, at 105; Lehn, Blackwell & Mart, supra note 148,
at 185; Oesterle, supra note 218, at 140; see also McDaniel, Bondholders II, supra note 10, at 238-45
(in the aggregate, bond prices reflect expropriation risk, since market model assumes diversified bond

portfolio).
229. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
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mediate mode also uses a weaker version of the efficient-market
hypothesis. 230 In this version the most sophisticated traders are completely rational and take account of all risks, but the market. price only
partially reflects these traders' information level. 23 1 Together these assumptions mean that bondholders have not been paid to bear the risk of
restructuring injury. This conclusion returns us to the starting point.
Bondholders have sustained an injury; the question is whether the injury
is tortious.
Commentators in the intermediate mode make their second modification at this point in the analysis. They apply the normative assumptions of financial economics to rebut the implication of a tort. Financial
economics calls for self-protection: if you can protect yourself with a
contract, then you should do so, unless you can show that positive law
protection serves the same function more cheaply. Since, by established
practice, bondholders always can self-protect with a covenant, 232 they
cannot successfully argue for implied-in-law duties. Injuries from bondholders' failure to protect themselves fall among the inevitable dislocations that occur in free-market economies. 233 The capital asset pricing
model positively and normatively reinforces this result by trivializing
bondholders' injuries. Rational bondholders diversify to reduce the risk
of expropriation; the law should not compensate irrational bondholders
who fail to protect themselves in this way.
Commentators who espouse the weak version of the agency approach reject an absolute norm of self-protection. They draw on corporate legal theory for countervailing norms. Contrary to the strong mode,
corporate legal theory does not embrace the pure agency model. More
forgiving of error and f6lly, it continues to mix the idea of the rational
economic actor with more realistic and holistic models. Whole persons
sometimes fail to protect themselves. This failure is an integral part of
the legally recognized behavior pattern. 23 For the same reason, the indi230. For discussion of the normative implications of applying the various versions of the efficient-market hypothesis to bondholder wealth transfer problems, see Bratton, Convertible Bond
supra note 10, at 704-08.
231. Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markes 70 AM.
ECON. Rnv. 393, 393-95 (1980).
232. See Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, supra note 148, at 185; Oesterle, supra note 218, at 140.
Commentary in this mode always neglects to analyze why fiduciary duties are cost beneficial only as
applied to stockholders. Why would not a new model of the corporation, in which stockholders, too,
"get covenants," better manifest the free contracting that underlies the financial economics models?
Under the received model, of course, stockholders need not contract for protection. But financial
economics does not accept the received legal model as inevitable.
233. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 62, at 104-06 (voluntary creditors are compensated
for the risk they bear when they do not contract for protections).
234. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 190, at 50-51.
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vidualist norm applied in the intermediate mode is not an absolute mandate; the law adjusts to excuse failures in some situations. The weak
mode, in effect, takes this approach. It applies the tools of financial economics together with notions of investor protection and relational values
such as solidarity. This wide range of norms leaves considerable room
for argument over which norm should determine the legal result in a
given situation. If investor protective and relational norms are accorded
determinative weight, then a case for legal protection is articulated. At
some point, of course, arguments for legal protection become so strong as
to dissolve ties to agency literature; such analysis would occupy a gray
area between the agency and investment conceptions.
The leading exemplar of commentary in the weak mode, that of Professor Coffee, does not go so far as to dissolve ties to the agency conception, however. Coffee uses the tools of financial economics to sustain the
conclusion that restructuring-related wealth transfers are nontortious.
This analysis of the wealth transfer issue probably would persuade most
observers in the legal profession, whether academics or practitioners. 235
It therefore merits close consideration.
Coffee compares bondholders with the other primary victims of
wealth transfers, managers. Both groups can contract for protection but
often do not. Yet, Coffee implies legal protection only for the managers.
To reach this result, he balances various indeterminate factors, most of
which ultimately come from the financial economists' individualist toolbox. For example, in Coffee's view, managers make an expropriable
firm-specific investment, but bondholders do not, because bondholders
can diversify. 23 6 Moreover, although Coffee's approach does not demand
perfect self-protection, he notes that bondholders can adjust for future
uncertainties by demanding covenants, by insisting on a direct voice in
corporate decisionmaking, or by simply avoiding long-term unsecured
debt securities. 3 7 Although bondholders dispensed with covenants in reliance on management's apparently durable structural power, that reliance was culpable-bondholders took a "free ride" on management's
known aversion to risk.23 s In any event, Coffee reasons, the law should
recognize that stockholders' gains from restructurings outstrip bond235. Market practices provide at least some support for this result. Given the securitization of

debt investments, investors have substantial opportunities to protect themselves. Although bondholders have been incurring real losses, self-protective practices might fairly be assumed to have
softened these losses. And possibilities for contract modification make the ongoing policy problem
of debt and restructuring less than urgent. The next generation of contracts can contain covenants.
236. For an extensive discussion, see Bratton, Nexus of ContractsApprais supra note 12.
237. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 190, at 50.

238. Ia
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holders' losses. 239
Coffee's analysis, while powerful, does not preempt the field of debate in this mode. A bondholder-protective critic can work free of it,
arguing that Coffee's practical balancing exercise has a weak normative
base and makes an incomplete analysis of culpability. Coffee's "freeriding" bondholder is certainly no more, and perhaps less, culpable than
other actors in a restructuring. Though the managers whom Coffee favors suffer greater loss and have less of a chance to protect themselves,
their self-interested behavior makes the bondholders' free ride possible
and, more generally, provokes restructurings in the first place.24° Nor is
it clear that bondholders ride "free." The cost savings achieved by the
abandonment of covenants does not necessarily accrue to bondholders.
It might benefit borrowers or fall into both pockets.
This normative criticism of Coffee extends to his differential treatment of bondholders and managers. His individualist attack on the
bondholders coexists uneasily with his relational recognition of managers' injury. 24 1 To support this treatment, Coffee's model renders the
manager as a whole person, but the bondholder as a cardboard cutout
patterned by financial economics. The observer's subjective understanding of the flesh-and-blood manager counters the impulse to apply an individualistic norm. Yet Coffee's bondholders receive no such charity. This
approach does have a basis in fact-in today's securitized world, managers seem more like whole people than do investors. But, as we have seen,
no single model of the bondholder suffices. Real people with real stakes
in bonds, whether as investments or career vehicles, suffer injury, even
though most bonds belong to the faceless managers of diversified portfolios. There exists no principle in private legal theory that lets us compensate one injured person, but not one who belongs to a second,
indistinguishable group and sustains an equivalent injury.
This argument against differential treatment of managers and bondholders can be restated affirmatively to support legal bondholder protection. It can even be stated so as to admit the relevance of the main points
239. Id. at 51.
240. Management seems to have initiated the omission of covenants. Significantly, the commentator most vigorously promoting a managerialist response to the restructurings, McDaniel, asserts
that covenants provide bondholders with ineffective protection. See supra note 217; infra notes 24952 and accompanying text.
241. Of course, dislocated managers are real people; for that reason, their injuries command
more attention. Though real people hold bonds, portfolio diversification and other devices protect
most of these beneficiaries from injury. This distinction, while real, fails to explain the division of
rights in restructurings. The chief beneficiaries of such events, holders of common stock, are no
more "real" than the bondholders.
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of agency theory. The contract-law good faith duty242 provides a doctrinal framework within which this balance can be struck. The good faith
duty permits judicial intervention against one-sided performance of particular contracts. The intervening court restores balance and ethical substance to exchanges that have become nonreciprocal in the course of a
long performance period. The intervention is ex post in perspective, and
the substantive inquiry is ad hoc in scope. In contrast to a corporate
fiduciary duty, the intervention implies no commitment to an extended
future of legal protection. 243
In the context of restructuring-related bondholder injury, a court
could base a good faith duty on parties' expectations of secure capital
structure as actually applied in high-grade bond valuation until 1985,
when high-grade bond issuers became vulnerable to restructuring. Limiting the duty's application to this pre-1985 bond market expectation follows from recognition of the concerns of agency theory. But this
approach limits the effect of agency theory in turn. The self-protective
possibilities it highlights would determine the legal outcome only for
bonds issued after 1985, with respect to which self-protection by market
actors could be expected as a practical matter.
This compromise solution would be subject to legitimate attack
from both sides. It would not solve the problem of bond contract failure
by imposing a clear prospective allocation of restructuring risk. Nor
would it fully vindicate the self-protective norm, or incorporate the lessons of agency theory on their own terms. Moreover, good-faith-based
judgments in favor of bondholder plaintiffs would disrupt the legal status
quo and thereby result in new rounds of wealth transfers between issuers
and bondholders. The rebuttal to these practical criticisms would emphasize wider normative objectives. To those arguing for full bondholder
protection, the response would be that judicial intervention to protect
securityholders never amounts to a mandate for perfect contracting. Instead, it causes parties to focus attention on particular problems. More
importantly, it makes a supplemental rather than primary outside contribution to the normative pattern of the parties' relationships. This contribution is in part symbolic; the parties can choose to disregard it. But it
also has a bondholder-protective practical impact: it puts the burden of
specificity on the party who seeks to disrupt settled expectations. To
those arguing for full application of agency principles, the response
would be that the ad hoc, ex post character of intervention under the
242. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
243. I articulate a good-faith-based approach along these lines in Bratton, Convertible Bonds,
supra note 10, at 714-19.
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good faith rubric always leaves the terms of future transactions open to
negotiation. 244 Issuers seeking to impose restructuring risk on bondholders can do so securely and cheaply by adding a simple sentence to this
effect in their bond contracts.
a The investment conception. Proponents of the investment conception make an unqualified case for bondholder protection. They depict
restructuring-related wealth transfers as a contract failure, then pursue
one of two lines of argument. Some advocate a fiduciary duty to bondholders. Others advocate legal intervention in the contracting process to
make debt contracts more bondholder-protective.

L Fiduciary duty. Berle suggested reconstructing corporate law
to redirect management efforts to serving the balanced interest of all
investors. 245 Advocates of a fiduciary duty to bondholders take a Berlian
approach: they reject the "nexus-of-contracts" conception, 246 modeling

the firm as an entity in which various interest groups pursue long-term
relationships subject to management's higher power. Then they introduce points basic to the investment conception: stocks and bonds are

simply different versions of long-term investment in firms; therefore,
bondholders should not be excluded from participation in firms. From

these tenets fiduciary duty advocates suggest a management duty to maximize the value of the firm from stockholders' and bondholders' com-

bined perspectives. 247

As they must, the fiduciary duty advocates reject the agency analysis
of wealth transfers. First, they question the strong agency model's assertion that bond prices reftect risks of restructurings, stressing the unex244. Functional considerations do not make a compelling case against bondholder protection.
Bondholder protection in law would not necessarily impede value-maximizing transactions. See
Lehn, BlackweU & Marr, supra note 148, at 185-86. If market actors found such protection inappropriate, they could draft it out of future contracts in a sentence or two. Bratton, Convertible Bonb
supra note 10, at 718-19.
245. A. BERLE, supra note 28, at 191-92.
246. See supra text accompanying note 147.
247. McDaniel, BondholdersI, supra note 10, at 303-05. McDaniel supports his position with a
survey of cases involving stockholder-bondholder disputes. Id. at 274-304. He contends that when
a transaction that affects stockholders' and bondholders' wealth is not Pareto-efficient, the courts
intervene to award damages to the bondholders, thereby elevating the transaction to Pareto-efficient
status. Id. at 304. Barkey, supra note 161, at 68, claims that a "generic managerial fiduciary duty"
requires management to utilize assets efficiently for the joint benefit of stockholders and bondholders. Surprisingly, Barkey supports this asserted fiduciary duty with financial economics, particularly
the option pricing model. He states that the model's view of the firm as a possession of bondholders,
subject to stockholders' option to repurchase, reflects bondholders' "first equitable ownership" of
corporate assets. Id. at 69.
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pected nature of many restructurings. 248 Second, they dispute the
intermediate mode's assertion that bondholders can readily and cheaply
obtain full contractual protection. Covenants, they argue, cannot effectively regulate corporate borrowers' opportunistic conduct. 249 Moreover, market strategies like diversification and exit provide less than
complete protection in the real world. Exit works only with slowly deteriorating issuers; diversification never perfectly eliminates risks. "Bondholders,' a diverse group of individuals and institutions, have different
cost bases for their investments and different self-protective capabilities.
No market strategy will ever eliminate the possibility of injury to such a
group. 250 On a more positive note, the advocates claim that a bondholder fiduciary duty would be efficient. By offering everyone investment
security, the duty would reduce agency costs. 2 51 Moreover, the expense
252
of judicial enforcement of the duty would not be burdensome.
Three substantial barriers confront the argument for a bondholder
fiduciary duty. First, the investment conception influences corporate law
only marginally. Even the few cases that recognize a fiduciary duty do
not suggest that it overrides the provisions of bond contracts. Second,
the advocates' managerialist conception of the firm no longer fully describes business practice. Nor does it command universal acceptance in
the legal community. Finally, the duty derives from a broader management duty to pursue optimal returns on invested capital. But the law,
while it requires management to pursue profit and gain, 2 53 does not measure management performance against an optimality standard. The business judgment rule restricts judicial scrutiny of management's investment
decisionmaking, and corporate law stops well short of mandating optimal performance even to benefit stockholders.
iL The contracting proces& Some advocates of the investment
conception reject fiduciary duties, 254 turning instead to reform of the
contracting process. These commentators also treat wealth transfers as
contract failures, but suggest a different remedy. They deem business
covenants sufficient, provided that the law can direct market actors to
248. McDaniel, Bondholders II supra note 10, at 240-45; Barkey, supra note 161, at 69 (bond-

holder wealth "unanticipatedly expropriated from bondholders").
249. See supra note 217.
supra note 10, at 243-45; McDaniel, Bondholders I,supra note
250. McDaniel, BondholdersII,
10, at 433-36.
251. McDaniel, Bondholders IIsupra note 10, at 245-51.
252. Id at 251-52 (projecting approach to damage calculation in succcessful bondholder action),
253. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
254. Robertson, supra note 196, at 483 (Fiduciary duties ignore the "essential difference in the
nature of the legal claims asserted by both stockholders and debenture holders.").
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include sufficiently strong ones. Regulation-in the form of a corporate
trustee empowered and required to exact contract protections-is the
255
means to this end.
This approach provides a useful technical counter to the fiduciary
duty arguments. Considered in the abstract as a reform proposition, it
makes substantial sense. But it has overwhelming practical problems.
Mandatory covenants imposed under the auspices of "supertrustees"
would depart from the tradition of free contracting in corporate debtorcreditor relationships, a departure not taken even during the Depression.
This contract reform analysis, couched in old-fashioned policy terms,
will not attract a substantial constituency today.
No essential "error" invalidates either argument from the investment conception. They identify real contract failure. Yet, they misjudge
its magnitude, at least in light of today's financial community's values.
Self-protective practices diminish the urgency of the contract failures,
making prescriptions of fiduciary duties and process intervention seem
overwrought. These prescriptions become persuasive only in the event
that views on the desirability of restructurings take a sharp negative turn.
3. The TraditionalConception as a Barrierto Deal. The Special
Case of the Leveraged Buyout The three debt conceptions interact in
surprising ways in the commentary on leveraged buyouts (LBOs). The
commentators want to avoid intervention against highly leveraged
restructurings under the traditional insolvency standard. Toward this
end, they link the investnient and agency conceptions. The conjunction
is unique and noteworthy-in effect, investor-protective concepts come
together with aspects of agency theory that facilitate investor injury.
LBOs involve leverage so high that restructured companies sometimes start life at or near insolvency. As is usual with restructuring
transactions, acquirers "take out" stockholders with the proceeds of new
borrowing. The target does not receive proceeds of this borrowing, even
though its assets are pledged to secure the debt. If the transaction skirts
insolvency, the target's creditors can make fraudulent conveyance objections to the validity of the security interests in its assets and the payments
to its stockholders. 256 Applying basic fraudulent conveyance law, courts
257
have sustained the objections.
255. In appropriate circumstances, a trustee may waive these protections. Id. at 484-85.
256. Carlson, supra note 23, at 74-75.
257. Courts have invalidated mortgages, security interests, and guaranties granted by target corporations that have become insolvent, see United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288,
1298-99 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying fraudulent conveyance law to prevent bad-faith mortgage
purchases from defrauding creditors), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987), or have been left with
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This situation, at last, presents a case ofjudicial intervention to pro-

tect creditors injured by restructurings. Significantly, the intervention
occurs under the rubric of debtor-creditor, rather than corporate law,
validating only traditional norms of creditor protection. Still, some com25
mentators question these interventions.
Both Baird and Jackson's 259 and Carlson's 26° studies argue for relaxation of fraudulent conveyance law's insolvency standard. Incident to
an LBO, insolvency has only technical significance. Indeed, they claim it

may even give new managers an incentive to work a corporation out of a
tight comer. Thus, the threat of legal intervention posed by the insolvency standard may arbitrarily deter useful transactions. Carlson would

modify the rule that challenges transactions in which a lender knows that
a debtor is insolvent. He would excuse these loans where the lender reasonably believes that the target can generate enough surplus cash to
cover payments on the debt incurred in connection with the LBO.26 1
Baird and Jackson also question the application of fraudulent convey-

ance law in these cases, but do not suggest a new rule.
Both Baird and Jackson's and Carlson's works offer the same justification for sustaining LBOs: even though an LBO injures preexisting
debt in the short run, the new management benefits the firm in the long
run.2 62 Unfortunately, this justification ignores the realities of an LBO.
It relies on a managerialist conception of individual sacrifice for the general good of the corporation. But the managerialism of sacrifice, with its
unreasonably small capital after leveraged buyouts, see Sharrer v. Sandias, 103 A.D.2d 873, 873-74,
477 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (1984) (applying UFCA § 5 to leveraged buyout). See also Credit Managers
Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 183-84 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (applying UFCA § 5, but finding
that target was not left with unreasonably small capital).
Counsel have objected strenuously. They have argued that since no one had heard of LBOs
when the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act appeared in 1924, courts should not assume that
legislatures intended the Act to invalidate such transactions. The Third Circuit made short shrift of
this argument in Tabor Court Realty, 803 F.2d at 1296-97. See also In re Ohio Corrugating Co., 70
Bankr. 920, 925-26 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (applying fraudulent conveyance laws is appropriate
and would not jeopardize all LBOs); In re Anderson Indus., 55 Bankr. 922, 926 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1985) (language of fraudulent conveyance act is unconditional and clearly applies to LBOs).
258. Practitioners seeking to simplify the law make time-honored arguments for "safe harbors"
in the statutes. Kirby, McGuinness & Kandel, Fraudulent Conveyance Concerns in Leveraged
Buyout Lending 43 Bus. LAW. 27, 36 (1987); Murdoch, Sartin & Zadek, Leveraged Buyouts and
Fraudulent Transfem"Life After Gleneagles, 43 Bus. LAW. 1, 2 (1987).
259. Baird & Jackson, supra note 28, at 851-52.
260. Carlson, supra note 23, at 95.
261. Id. at 95-100.
262. Id at 95; Baird & Jackson, supra note 28, at 853. Baird and Jackson add the shopworn
excuse that a corporation, once taken private, will save the costs of complying with the federal
securities laws. Id
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cooperative aspirations, implies an investment conception of debt. 263
Under an investment conception, the sacrificing investor supposedly gets
legal protection in return. But, as we have seen, 264 corporate law, consistent with its assimilation of the traditional conception, refuses this protection. Even as it accepts fraudulent conveyance principles as a minimal
backstop, it continues to exclude creditors from the benefits of firm participation. To cut back on this minimal protection for the corporate entity's benefit is wrongly one-sided-a "heads I win; tails you lose"
exercise.
The lack of reciprocity in this approach stands out even more
starkly against the factual background of the standard LBO. An LBO
does not occur because promoters, managers, and financiers decide to
improve a corporation for the good of preexisting investors; it occurs
because it offers sure profits for the equity taken out and a chance for
extravagant, but high-risk, profits for the promoters and managers who
take control and for the financiers who help them. Preexisting creditors
share this risk, but get no compensation in the form of a higher interest
rate or an option to exit at face value. These creditors' "upside," if the
corporation recovers, is to return to their original position-holding a
fixed coupon that bars them from further "upside" possibilities. Of
course, when a corporation is suffering a serious decline, this chance to
return to square one may carry substantial benefits. But a rational creditor might well prefer to explore some transactional alternatives first. Removing fraudulent conveyance protection deprives this creditor of the
power to demand consideration of alternative solutions.
The commentators, then, seek to justify LBOs as beneficial recapitalizations for declining.corporations, yet they reverse the usual hierarchy of priorities in recapitalizations and reorganizations. Even outside of
bankruptcy, creditors generally surrender rights only if equityholders
make even greater sacrifices. In LBOs, no one asks for the creditors'
consent, and the equity walks away at a premium! The commentators
can justify this bizarre result only by intermixing the three conceptions of
debt without regard to their origins, positive implications, or normative
content. They also draw a narrow, Panglossian picture of LBOs themselves. At bottom, this work amounts to ad hoc apologetics for a popular, profitable transaction form. The work fails as doctrine, policy, and
theory.
Baird and Jackson, inspired by financial economics, advance a second theory that withholds protection from debtholders harmed by LBOs.
263. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (describing how investment conception depicts relations among debtholders, equityholders, and management).
264. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
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They assert that fraudulent conveyance law is essentially contractual and
therefore needs narrow interpretation, lest it call for results that parties
would not have reached if left to their own contractual devices. 265 Building on this assertion, Baird and Jackson adopt the intermediate mode of
agency analysis 266 and contend that if contracting creditors really wanted
fraudulent conveyance protection, dividend and other covenants that
perform the same function should be ubiquitous, which they are not. If
creditors forgo protective covenants, the authors reason, they have themselves to blame for their injuries. Replacing fraudulent conveyance law
with optional covenants would prove a superior, more flexible approach
anyway. Parties can adjust contracts, but not the positive law of fraudulent conveyances.
With this argument, Baird and Jackson again confront preexisting
creditors with a Catch-22. Positive-law protection is valid only when it
saves preexisting creditors the costs of contracting. 267 But when credi-

tors try to save costs by relying on positive law, Baird and Jackson turn
the tables: such reliance proves that the positive law was unnecessary in
the first place. Of course, as Baird and Jackson tell us, parties can waive
contracts. But they can waive many positive law rights as well. Moreover, in any event, Baird and Jackson have no business throwing waivers
in the face of preexisting creditors. A waiver is an act of consent by a
party who willingly gives up a right. By proposing to disregard fraudulent conveyance law, Baird and Jackson seek to eliminate the legal requirement that creditors consent to LBOs, all to facilitate valuemaximizing maneuvers by the forces in power. They envision a world of
contract more Orwellian than Smithian.
Finally, fraudulent conveyance law does not prohibit LBOs; it regulates them by limiting permissible leverage. This regulation might go too
far, and the traditional mediation of corporate debtors' and creditors'
interests, as it applies to these transactions, might need change. To make
this case persuasively, however, one must approach the traditional norm
on its own terms, showing why its constituent elements no longer support its application. Until someone makes this case, however, the courts
268
would do well to ignore this commentary on LBOs.
265. Baird & Jackson, supra note 28, at 834-36 (fraudulent conveyance law should attempt to

provide an agreement that the parties would have made).
266. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 28.
268. See, ag., Sherwin, Creditors'Rights Against Participantsin a Leveraged Buyout, 72 MiNN.
L. REv. 449,490-96, 505-21 (1988) (courts should apply fraudulent conveyance statutes to LBOs to
protect creditors against overreaching or undue risk, but courts, in applying fraudulent conveyance
remedies, should consider the business setting of the LBO at issue and the risk of discouraging

legitimate business acquisitions). Baird himself has articulated a modified position that recognizes
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4. Responses in Business Practice. The three debt conceptions
paint three disparate pictures of the real-world bondholder facing a restructuring-related wealth transfer. Under the traditional conception,
the holder responds with equanimity. So long as interest checks and
sinking-fund payments come in on schedule, the bondholder sees the
drop in principal value as more hypothetical than real. The investment
conception, in contrast, makes downgrading a disaster because downgrading substantially impairs the investment's value. The innocent holders respond with cries of anguish, lawsuits, and reform movements.
Under the agency conception, with its rational actors and self-protective
devices, the holders stay calm as they maintain their well-guarded defensive positions.
Evidence of real-world responses indicates that all three pictures
contain some truth. As time has passed, however, the investment community has moved away from an investment-based model to an agency
model. Back in 1985 and 1986, when holders of high-grade corporate
bonds first suffered wealth transfers, the "investment" response was
prominent. The financial press reported anger among institutional holders, who complained of "shock" and "disquiet." 269 They felt that their
interests were being ignored, 270 and that they were "left holding the
bag" 27 1 and treated "like garbage." 272 People who were supplying 50%
of the average enterprise's capital, they said, did not deserve such treatment. 273 They made a classic policy argument for investor protection: if
industrial concerns' long-term debt obligations came to involve one-way
gambles on restructuring risk, investors would avoid buying them, 274 and
industrials would pay higher interest rates as a result.27 5 These investors
also lobbied for protection. In December 1986, the Fixed Income Analysts Society passed a so-called "Bondholders' Bill of Rights"-a resolu276
tion calling for fiduciary duties to protect all investors.
the competing factors at stake in LBOs. See D. Baird, Fraudulent Conveyances and Leveraged
Buyouts 10-17 (Feb. 2, 1989) (unpublished manuscript; copy on file in offices of the Duke Law
Journal).
269. Forsyth, Bad Grades: Takeovers Teach a Costly Lesson to Bond Holders, Barron's, Feb. 24,
1986, at 26, col. 1, col. 3.
270. Prokesch, supra note 192, at Al, col. 1, col. 1.
271. Id.
272. Boland, supra note 192, at 10, col. 3.
273. See ad
274. Instead, they would prefer treasuries and utlity bonds. Forsyth, supra note 269, at 26, cols.

3-4.
275. Prokesch, supra note 192, at D4,col. 1; Farrell, supra note 191, at 114 ("it's only a matter
of time" before bond market risks raise yields on corporate bonds as compared with Treasury securities (quoting Henry Kaufman of Salomon Bros.)).
276. See Letter from Fixed Income Analysts Society, Inc. to Members (n.d.) (copy on file in
offices of the Duke Law Journal) (reporting two-thirds approval of referendum on "Bill of Rights");
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The complaining had little effect. Neither the courts, the Congress,
nor the Securities Exchange Commission came to the rescue. Nor did
covenants eliminating the restructuring risk appear in new issues right
away. Managers of public bond issuers continued to resist covenants. As
before, they searched for the underwriter willing to impose the fewest
restraints. 277 In 1988, investors in bonds issued after 1985 were still
complaining of restructuring-related injury. 278 Only following the great
RJR Nabisco restructuring did a major institutional investor mount a
279
lawsuit based on investor-protective principles.
By 1988, however, stress on innocent investors' disempowerment
and injury had begun to give way to the agency notion that those who
fail to contract to protect themselves have only themselves to blame. In
that year, several fund managers, reeling from new restructuring-related

injuries, formed an "Institutional Bondholders Rights Association."
This time, in contrast to the Fixed Income Analysts' earlier call for a
fiduciary duty, the investors .called for collective action to stimulate the
reappearance of effective protective covenants. Bondholders, they said,

should be willing to accept a lower interest rate to get such covenants.
The cost would be twenty-five basis points. 2 ° If people would read trust
indentures, one prominent manager said, protections would follow; those
281
who look outside for help are "crybabies."
This movement shows promise. At institutional purchasers' insistence, protective covenants have begun to reappear in publicly sold
bonds. 282 Meanwhile, the rating agencies have been taking cognizance of
Letter from Fixed Income Analysts Society, Inc. to Members (Dec. 23, 1986) (copy on file in offices
of the Duke Law Journal) (explaining the "Bill of Rights" and requiring that votes for or against be
tendered by January 31, 1987); see also Bleiberg, Bondholders, Unitel Issuers Are GettingAway with
Highway Robbery, Barron's, Nov. 24, 1986, at 9, col 1, col. 4 (discussing Society's work on the
resolution).
277. Boland, supra note 192, at 10, col. 4; see also Roe, supra note 103, at 250 (junk bonds have
few covenants); Taggart, supra note 135, at I1 n.4 (original-issue junk bonds have fewer covenants
than investment-grade bonds).
278. Boland, supra note 192, at 10, col. 3; see Winkler & Smith, Sore Junk-Bond Holders Form
Rights Group but Say They Aren't Lookingfor a Free Re, Wall St. J., June 30, 1988, at 61, col. 3
(bondholders banding together to protect investments from restructurings).
279. See supra note 8.
280. Winkler & Smith, supra note 278; see also Zigas, The Bonds Most Investors Never Hear
About, Bus. WK., Sept. 19, 1988, at 152, 153 (public buyers, particularly institutions, insisting on
covenants from issuers).
281. Winkler & Smith, supra note 278.
282. Zigas, supra note 280, at 153. The movement to include covenants against restructuringrelated wealth transfers has already gone through two stages of development. A well-publicized new
form of covenant, the "poison put," appeared after 1985 and quickly became common in publicly
issued bonds. But this "poison put," in its standard form, protects bondholders only as a side effect
of protecting management from hostile tender offers. Independent directors may be able to waive a
"poison put" to facilitate wealth transfers incident to defensive moves. See Clemens, Poison Debt:
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restructuring risk. The trading halts and wealth transfers that greeted
the food company restructurings of late 1988 gave this investor self-help

movement additional momentum. 283 At the same time, however, the
very magnitude of this latest bondholder disaster shows just how far the
24
movement has to go. 8

In the wider investment community, the self-protective response has
long dominated. Indeed, outside of the relatively small group of institu-

tional managers who compose portfolios of bonds, no one seems to have
considered the wealth transfers a significant problem. Given the preva-

lence of institutional holding 285 and diversification, the injuries, while
real, have not seemed painful. Covenants have not become more effec-

tive, but bond durations have dropped markedly, further limiting the impact of wealth transfers. 286 To many observers, in fact, the years of
restructuring have been good ones with respect to bond returns. A bull

market in bonds lasted until

1987.287

We can infer that institutional perspectives have thus far determined

market responses to restructuring-related injury. In the last three years,
high-grade corporate bond portfolio managers who relied on past conThe New Takeover Defense. 42 Bus. LAW. 747, 750-51, 753 (1987). Similar restructuring-related
wealth transfers occurred in the seminal Revlon case, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). Such waivers have occurred in other cases as well, leaving behind
surprised, injured bondholders. See Zigas, The One-TWo Punch Pummeling Convertibles Bus. WK.,
Feb. 8, 1988, at 82.
In 1988, the bond market caught on to the limited protection offered by the "poison put."
Herman & Stine, Bonds Stage Rebound Amid Declining Oil Prices and a Hint That the Fed Isn't
Tightening Credit; Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1988, at C21, col. 4. According to one observer, "poison puts
haven't been worth a bucket of warm spit." Winlder, supra note 2, at Cl, col. 5 (quoting Richard
Wilson, manager of corporate bond research at Merrill Lynch). Holders began to demand new
protections. One proposal would effect rate increases to compensate for restructurings. Wallace,
supra note 3, at D5, col. 3. Another proposal would give bondholders the privilege to put their
bonds back to the issuer at the bonds' initial yield over specified Treasury securities. It When one
issuer recently went to market with an effective-looking put provision, Moody's raised the issues
rating. Farrell, Miller & Zigas, supra note 8, at 28.
283. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
284. Even after the RIR Nabisco fiasco, one underwriter opined that effective covenants were
still unlikely to appear: "It isn't clear that there is sufficient homogeneity of interest on either the
buy ... side or sell ... side to have a poison put that is effective .... " Winkler, supra note 2, at Cl,
col. 4 (quoting Curt Welling, managing director of First Boston Corp.).
285. According to Roe, institutions hold 90% of the bond market and 95% of the junk bond
market. Roe, supra note 103, at 258-59 (citing BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
FLOW OF FUNDS AccouNTS, FINANCIAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, YEAR-END, 1961-1984).
286. The average years to maturity of corporate junk bonds have fallen from 19 years in the late
1970s to 11 years in 1985, in response to the inflation of the late 1970s. See Taggart, supra note 135,
at 11 n.4.
287. See Uchitelle, Bonds in Slump as DollarStirs Fear ofInflation, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1987,
at 1, col. 2. The new junk bond market gives all holders access to bonds offering three to five points
over Treasury securities with upside potential if issuers' fortunes improve. THE ECONOMIST, June
11, 1988, American Capital Markets Survey, at 15 [hereinafter CapitalMarkets Survey].
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tracting practices have experienced something like the suffering of an
underdiversified individual investor. To them the wealth transfers at first
looked tortious. Over time, however, this group has begun to adjust, albeit with noteworthy hesitation. Relying on the security of management's position no longer makes sense. The market price even of pre1985 bonds now seems partially to reflect restructuring risk. And holders of new debt issues can foresee and contractually control restructuring-related injury; they cannot easily claim to have been victimized.
Significantly, prior to the RJR Nabisco transaction, no segment of
the investment community vigorously tried to get courts to reverse past
wealth transfers. Not only the relatively unfavorable state of the law, but
also the community's broader interests, explain this inaction. To most
market players, the agency conception captured the essence of the restructuring phenomenon all along. Individual investors lack a substantial stake in high-grade corporate bonds and stand to profit from
restructurings as holders of securities that these transactions benefit.
They view bondholder injuries as trivial, and self-protection as a norm
applicable to everyone but themselves. This picture becomes sharper
where institutional investors are concerned, especially the largest institutions-the "financial supermarkets." An institution might suffer from a
wealth transfer in its capacities as mutual fund advisor and bondholder
for its own account, while at the same time holding and advising portfolios of securities that restructurings benefit. Moreover, its investment
banking arm might actively promote restructurings. For this institution
as a whole, then, the wealth transfers will be Kaldor-Hiecks-efficient. 28 8
Restructuring gains will more than offset losses experienced in and
around the bond portfolios. The bond losses will seem catastrophic only
to the managers directly responsible for bond portfolios. And even to
these managers, a downgrading is not the same thing as a payment default. Although the market value of the portfolio drops, the late 1970s
inflation brought far worse losses. Overall, large institutions have no
compelling stake in bondholder protection.
5. Summary. Corporate rights are based on clear and accessible
pictures of injury, featuring clearly modeled injured individuals. Stockholders commonly appear in these pictures. But, somehow, there
emerges no picture of a legal bondholder injury. Elements that could
make up such a picture are present in the facts and the law. But the
elements never quite coalesce. Instead, they disaggregate and disappear
as the law remands bondholders to their contracts. However flawed as
288. See R. PoSNER, supra note 21, at 12-14 (giving example of a Kaldor-Hicks-efficient

transaction).

Vol. 1989:92]

CORPORATE DEBT RELATIONSHIPS

protective documents, these contracts make self-protection technically
easy for bondholders-easier than for stockholders. This situation
makes bondholders seem virtually immune from tortious harm. By fixating on contracts, legal decisionmakers can handle conflicts over bonds
without noticing the disparateness of bondholders as a class. Thus, real
actors subject to real injury stay comfortably far away. With stockholder
disputes in contrast, real actors play a large role in the story; stockholder
torts thus continue to occur despite contrary lessons from agency theory.
Nothing in legal theory dictates that this pattern of response continue. But then, nothing in theory or practice dictates its abandonment.
The pattern endures because practical forces support it. The investment
community and most of its individual members want no barriers erected
against restructurings. Corporate managers pursue their own interests;
in so doing they oppose the investment community, but they do not
thereby advance bondholder interests. Moreover, while there are plenty
of bondholders, there is no bondholder interest group. Without institutional prompting, no bondholder tort will emerge; the theoretical case is
too marginal to support spontaneous legal reform. The investment conception never quite provides a basis for a persuasive story of a right impaired; continuing respect for the integrity of bond contract texts
undermines its portrayal of injury. The securitized, agency vision of
debt, in contrast, has enough real-world backing to rebut inferences of
injury from wealth transfers.
This pattern breaks only with the application of fraudulent conveyance principles to LBOs.. Here, traditional and investment considerations together determine the legal response. Traditional impulses suggest
legal intervention when a firm becomes insolvent. But this intervention
reflects a negative judgment on the desirability of high debt-equity ratios
at least as much as a creditor-protective policy. An agency-based challenge to the insolvency standard questions this aversion to high-risk capital structures. Full explication of this issue requires consideration of the
broader question of how corporate legal theory addresses the regulation
of debt-equity ratios. This discussion follows.
B.

High Leverage and Corporate Law

Historically, business theory and practice have valued conservative
leverage. The theory changed in the 1960s and 1970s, when financial
2 89
economists denied that conservative leverage had intrinsic value.
Business practice has recently followed suit, shifting toward higher leverage and looking to finance theory for legitimating ideas. Corporate law
289. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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interferes with this business behavior only incidentally, by throwing up
minor barriers like the fraudulent conveyance constraint against marginal LBOs. According primacy to management discretion, corporate law
has never imposed immediate constraints on leverage. It has assimilated
policies favoring conservative leverage only at its margins.
But the law rarely leaves matters such as this completely unregulated. It in effect stands back and watches events. It serves a mediating
function, sanctioning free contracting among economic actors, provided
that the free play causes no cognizable social ill. If, at some future date,
the new risk-prone business practices seem to entail excessive social
costs, corporate legal theory will legitimate regulation, 29° notwithstanding protests backed by financial economic theory.
1. The New Debt-Equity Ratios.
a. Evidence The statistics establish beyond doubt that American
businesses have markedly increased their leverage in recent years, and
that they have broken longstanding financing patterns in doing so. First
consider the broader picture. The standard measure of aggregate American indebtedness encompasses all obligations, public and private, other
than those of financial intermediaries. This aggregate increased by an
average of 11.8% per year during 1985, 1986, and 1987.291 This aggregate, expressed as a percentage of gross national product, yields an aggregate national debt-equity ratio. From 1945 to 1983, this figure stayed
around 140%.292 In fact, except for the Depression era, this figure has
been stable for as far back into the nineteenth century as data are available. The figure began increasing in 1983.293 By 1988, it had risen to
181.4%, a level previously experienced only in the early 1930s. 294 The
national debt-equity ratio is rising because businesses have increased
their leverage in relation to net worth; most of this increase stems from
295
the corporate restructuring movement.
Now consider the corporate borrowers themselves. Their leverage
has increased dramatically, by a number of measures. The traditional
debt-equity measure-debt as a percentage of book value--states the
290. For further discussion of this mediating function of corporate law, see Bratton, Nexus of
ContractsAppraisal, supra note 12.
291. CapitalMarkets Survey, supra note 287, at 28.
292. Id. at 27.
293. Although amounts of private and government debt have fluctuated, they were negatively
correlated until 1980. Then, as business debt began increasing, they became positively correlated. B.
FRIEDMAN, INCREASING INDEBTEDNESS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 4

(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2072, Nov. 1986).
294. Capital Markets Survey, supra note 287, at 27.
295. B. FRIEDMAN, supra note 293, at 12.

Vol. 1989:92]

CORPORATE DEBT RELATIONSHIPS

most extreme case. In 1962, aggregate corporate debt was 58.2% of
book value; in 1983, it was 73%; in 1984, it was 81.4%.296 In the second
quarter of 1988, net interest payments amounted to more than 20% of
corporate cash flow, a proportion equaled only in 1974 and 1982, recession years with high interest rates. 297 The raw dollar amounts of borrowing have also seen dramatic increases. During 1984 and 1985,
nonfinancial corporate debt rose $384 billion, while equity shrank $99
billion, despite retained earnings of $53 billion and new equity issuance
of negative $152 billion.298 The number of LBOs, hallmark high-leverage
transactions, rose from 99 in 1981 to 308 in 1986; their total value increased from $3.1 billion to $40.9 billion. 29 The original-issue junk
bond, another tool in the high-leverage movement, took on a new role as
a primary financing technique in large restructurings. From 1981 to
1984, junk bond sales provided only 0.3% of takeover financing; by 1985,
this figure had risen to 13.6%. Almost all of this growth occurred in
junk bond financing of takeovers of larger corporations. In 1984, junk
bonds provided 32.9% of the capital for these transactions.3m
A few additional factors make this picture appear less startling.
First, comparisons of indebtedness with the market value, as opposed to
the book value, of assets have not risen as markedly. For instance, in
1984, the ratio of debt to asset replacement cost was 49.4%, a level
slightly below the peak figures of 1970-1972.3 1 Second, until October
1987, rising stock market values counterbalanced growth in corporate
indebtedness. 30 2 Third, even as the quantity of junk bonds has risen dra296. And more and more of the borrowing is short-term. In 1985, short-term borrowing had
risen to 52% of the corporate total. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 190, at 41.
297. America's Third Debt Bubble THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1988, at 79 [herenafter Debt

Bubble].
298. Lipton, supra note 137, at 20-22.
299. ECONOMICS DRv., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,

BtyoTs
(1987).

AND THE POT OF GOLD: TRENDS, PUBLIC POLICY, A!NiDCASE STUDIES

LEVERAGED

17 & tbl. 1-3

300. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, NONINVESTMENT GRADE DEBT AS A SOURCE

OF TENDER OFFER FINANCING, reprintedin [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI)
84,011 (June 20, 1986).
The 1987 stock market crash caused a lull in the amount of junk bond financing, but before the
end of the first quarter of 1988, takeover activity picked up again, and junk bond issuance picked up
with it, although buyers demanded higher quality or higher returns. Cowan, Signs of a Revival for
Junk Bonds N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1988, at D2, col. 1.
301. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 190, at 4445. The debt-to-equity ratio for 1970-1972
exceeded 50% on a current-value basis. &L
302. See B. FRIEDMAN, supra note 293, at 14. The ratio of debt to market value of equity
peaked at 106% in the 1974 bear market. It stood at 83% in 1984, and at 75% in 1988. Farrell,
Learning to Live with Leverage, Bus. WK., Nov. 7, 1988, at 138, 139.

S162
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matically, the junk bond default rate has stayed comfortably low. 303
b. Policy. Increased corporate indebtedness has not yet had an
obvious effect on financial stability.3s 4 Although no crisis has occurred,
commentators have paid considerable attention to the question whether
increased indebtedness creates an unjustifiable risk of a crisis. These
analyses divide into three positions-high pessimism, guarded pessimism, and optimism.
The high pessimists assert that high debt itself creates a risk of financial crisis. They foresee this scenario: as the quantity of debt continues
to grow, creditors will at some point lose confidence and abruptly withdraw their funds from the credit markets, causing a drastic curtailment
of economic activity.305 Significantly, those who fear this result also express the traditional judgment that there is "something wrong" with borrowing. Borrowing stems from weakness and creates risk. E4uity, in
contrast, stems from strength and creates security. Thus, according to
Henry Kaufman, the present heavy debt load undermines the "integrity"
of our financial system; it signifies that those in authority evade their
"responsibilities." s 6 Senator Proxmire, too, condemns the increase in
nonfinancial debt as a weakness. so 7 John Kenneth Galbraith compares
contemporary events to the most notorious debt disaster of the this century, the utility pyramiding of the 1920s and 1930S.308 And Felix
Rohatyn worries that the increased borrowing occurs during a period of
global competitive difficulty for American businesses. He expresses dis' '3°9
may: "Maybe I'm getting old.., but, boy, I think that's crazy.
Guarded pessimists worry about the incremental effect that higher
debt load will have during a cyclical downturn in the economy's nonfi303. For the period 1974-1985, the junk bond default rate was 1.53%; the rate for all publicly
issued bonds during this period was .09%. Taggart, supra note 135, at 12.
Junk bond yields have remained attractive; the default rates implied in junk bond interest rates

have exceeded the default losses actually experienced. Fons, The Default Premium and Corporate
Bond Experience 42 J. FIN. 81, 96 (1987).
304. B. FRIDMAN, supra note 293, at 14.
305. Capital MarketsSurvey. supra note 287, at 28.
306. FinancialRestructuring"Hearingson TakeoverActivity: MajorPolicy Issues Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerc4 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 383 (1985) (statement of Henry Kaufman, Executive Director,
Salomon Bros.).
307. The Effect ofMergers on Management Practices, Cost, Availability of Credit, and the Long.
Term Viability of American Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking; Housing and Urban Affairs; 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1985) [hereinafter Securities Subcommittee Hearings].
308. See Galbraith, The 1929 Paralle4 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1987, at 62, 64; Uchitelle,
Pushing the Stakes to New Heights, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
309. Securities Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 307, at 726.
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nancial performance. Under this view, debtors' distress will contribute
310
to, but will not itself cause, a decline in nonfinancial economic activity.
A downturn will cause cash flow problems for debtors. When they fail to
pay, they will cause their creditors to have cash flow problems. Further
curtailment of economic activity will result. In addition, forced asset
sales by strapped debtors will depress asset prices. 3 11 A wave of bankruptcies will follow. 312 In Friedman's view, the magnitude of today's
debt load makes the prospect of widespread debtor distress intolerable as
a matter of financial policy. Under this view, the new indebtedness in the
313
end encourages expansionary monetary policy and inflation.
Optimistic observers put a different interpretation on the guarded
pessimists' scenario. Since debt does not itself cause financial crisis, any
"problem" with high debt will solve itself if the economy has a period of
sustained growth. Given economic growth, along with a plateau in borrowing activity, aggregate indebtedness will drop back to historical levels
as a matter of course. 31 4 Some go further, arguing that serious disruption
should not occur even if the economy turns down in the short run. The
recent increases in leverage are concentrated in the corporate sectors best
able to withstand a recession-manufacturers of nondurables, utilities,
and financial services.315 Proponents of the restructuring movement add
that the restructurings themselves will help to keep the economy buoyant, because the discipline that restructurings bring stimulates productivity. 31 6 The stock market will respond favorably to these productivity
3 17
gains, and cash flow will keep pace with higher interest costs.
The high pessimists have not had much practical influence during
the past few years. Widespread, sustained discussion of law reform to
310. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., CORPORATE DEBT: A PROFILE
OF MAJOR INDICATORS 2, 4-5 (1986) [hereinafter CRS, DEBT PROFILE] (views of John Shad, Chairman of the SEC, and Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System); Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 190, at 44-45.
311. B. FRIEDMAN, supra note 293, at 19-24.
312. A recent study, applying assumptions drawn from the 1973-1974 recession, predicts that
10% of American corporations would become insolvent in such circumstances. Debt Bubble, supra
note 297, at 79.
313. B. FRIEDMAN, supra note 293, at 19-24; see also Roe, supra note 103, at 233 n.2 ("junk
bonds heighten related macroeconomic risks," such as inflation).
314. B. FRIEDMAN, supra note 293, at 19-24 (warning of debtor distress in a few industries even
under this scenario).
315. Don't Panic on Debt, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 1988, at 79.
316. CRS, DEBT PROFILE, supra note 310, at 8 (citing Morgan Stanley report); Uchitelle, supra
note 308, at 8, col. 3 (views of Michael Jensen, economist, Harvard Business School). The experiences of Phillips Petroleum and Burlington Industries serve as exemplars. Debt Bubble, supra note
297, at 80.
317. Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 190, at 44-45. Optimists also note that corporate debtequity ratios in Japan, West Germany, and Canada still are substantially higher than in the U.S.
Debt Bubble, supra note 297, at 79.
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lessen the dangers of high leverage started only after the RJR Nabisco
shock. Reforms that could reduce the leverage incentive could take place

without technical problems. To remove much of the leverage incentive,
Congress just has to eliminate the differential treatment of debt and equity in the tax code, whether by making interest payments nondeductible

or by making dividend payments deductible. 318 Not that restructurings
were exempt from criticism before RJR Nabisco. But critics have tended

to attack the restructuring movement for its destabilization of productive
institutions rather than for the aggregate levels of nonfinancial indebtedness it produces and consequent effects on financial stability. They attack the transformation of equity into debt, for diverting capital from
direct investment in "economic development" and "job creation." 3 19

Junk bonds are thought problematic as holdings, rather than as issues. 32"
The critics suggest only piecemeal solutions to these problems. 32'

This policy talk reflects a shift in thinking about debt and its associated risks. The grave suspicions of the high pessimists, particularly their
concern with confidence and integrity, previously dominated both finan-

cial theory and business practice. Now this approach amounts to a rearguard critique by the "heavy hitters" of an earlier generation. Today's
318. See CRS, RECE TENDs, supra note 220, at 3; see also SEC Must Report by May I on
LBO-Related RegulatoryAction, 21 See. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 512 (Apr. 7, 1989) (discussing forthcoming SEC report on changes in regulation of LBOs); Lipton, supra note 137, at 63
('mterest deduction for debt financing of hostile takeovers should be eliminated).
319. Taggart, supra note 135, at 5 (quoting letter signed by twelve U.S. Senators); see also
Proxmire, What's Right and Wrong About Hostile Takeovers?, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 353, 358-60.
320. Regulators worry about purchaser -purchasers who are uninformed about risks, as with
small investors, and purchasers who are too ready to take risks at someone else's expense, as with
federally insured financial institutions. See Coffee, Corporate Web, supra note 190, at 45 (savings
and loans and pension funds receive capital from individuals protected by federally funded insurance). In late 1986, the $120 to $125 billion ofjunk bonds outstanding were held as follows: insurance companies held $40 billion; pension funds held SO to S15 billion; mutual funds held S40
billion; savings and loans held $10 billion; individuals held $15 billion. Id at 45 n.l 19. The moral
hazard problem arises with the savings and loan holdings, which are heavily concentrated among a
few large savings and loans. Taggart, supra note 135, at 17-18.
321. Suggestions include applying the margin rules to high-yield securities and limiting federally
insured institutions' holdings of high-yield debt. See CRS, RECENT TRENDs, supra note 220, at 3.
Post-RJR Nabisco discussions of high debt show increased sensitivity to issues of risk. The
RJR transaction raises questions about the continuing efficacy of the safeguards that were built into
earlier restructuring-related borrowing waves. Restructured companies do not generally expect to
retain their extreme debt-equity ratios permanently. They usually pay down their borrowings during
the first few years and return to debt-equity ratios near or below the danger level. The economy's
aggregate default risk arguably stays tolerable as long as each generation of restructured enterprises
achieves this pay-down. The problem, of course, is that an economic downturn can disrupt this pay.
down process, causing widespread financial reverses. RJR Nabisco destabilized the perception of
safety by making the problem of such a disruption harder to ignore: the RJR borrowings are so
large and the business cycle so mature that the limited-damages perception becomes implausible,
particularly given the prospect of future rounds of restructuring.
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mainstream observers drop the moralism and lessen anxiety by viewing
debt as a neutral financing instrument, one of many devices that can support low-cost production. These observers thus take a financial economic
approach to debt. By justifying high leverage, financial economics challenges, and at least for the moment overtakes, the traditional and investment conceptions' contrary advice. The following discussion addresses
this theoretical shift and its implications.
2. High Leverage in FinancialTheory and Practice. According to
agency theory, the restructuring movement makes debt an instrument of
reform. 322 Entrenched managers, employing conservative financial policy, make suboptimal investments to suit their own interests rather than
those of their principals. Restructurings force management to change
this investment practice, and high leverage facilitates restructuring. This
view includes an implicit judgment that no internal norms necessarily
dictate debt policy. Debt serves other ends in the struggle for corporate
dominance-those of management and those of actors in the capital
markets.
This view displaces a contrary, once generally accepted, managerialist view. The managerialist view involves a different set of behavioral
assumptions. It asserts that corporate actors' risk preferences should dictate financial policy, and that, in fact, managers and equity holders have
a common interest regarding debt. A little leverage lowers financing
costs, and maximizes a firm's value for both groups. High leverage jeopardizes the firm's stability, making equity less valuable. Given risk aversion on everyone's part, good managers look for an optimal, moderate
level of debt. 323 The managerialists saw this approach as a lesson of
history.
a The managerialistview. Heavy debt was viewed as imprudent
long before management corporations appeared at the turn of the century. 324 Prudence followed from the traditional conception, with its
flesh-and-blood, mutually suspicious debtors and creditors. High leverage invited the destabilizing, opportunistic conduct that traditional
debtor-creditor law regulated. The occurrence of serious financial dislocations during the early years of the twentieth century reinforced the
application of the prudent view to the new mass-producing corporations.
Many corporations went into reorganization. In response, the new man322. See supra notes 228-40 and accompanying text.
323. See A. BARNEA, R. HAUGEN & L. SENBET, supra note 139, at 2; R. MARRIS, ECONOMIC
THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM 7-9 (1964).

324. See, eg., Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 77-79 (1880) (borrowing for investment of questionable

value violates directors' duty of care).
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agement groups made preservation of the corporate entity against bankruptcy and reorganization a major concern. Given fluctuations in the
business cycle, achieving this goal demanded conservative financial

policy: 325 the lower the debt-equity ratio, the more secure the firm. The
conventional wisdom called for firms to incur long-term debt only when

326
absolutely necessary, and to retire it as quickly as possible.
Subsequent cyclical downturns in 1920-1921 and 1929-1933 reinforced the lesson of the adverse consequences of trading on the equity.
Public utility and railroad holding companies, built up during the 1920s
only to collapse during the 1930s, were powerful object lessons supporting the prudent view. The holding companies were pyramids of corpo-

rate entities, constructed to magnify the financial leverage of small
groups of equityholders. 327 The managers and investment bankers who

built them claimed to be providing a means of efficient operation, but the
Depression experience proved them wrong. Dozens of utility companies
failed, even though industry revenues dropped only 15% from their high328
est historical levels.
The public utility bankruptcies resulted in a rare event of direct federal regulation of corporate capital structures, the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935. 329 This statute instantiated the prudent view. It
required the reorganized companies to have "balanced" capital structures, with substantial common stock "insuring" against bankruptcy.
Fortunately, the "insurance" was cheap: in view of investors' risk aver-

sion, "balanced" capital structures were the most cost-effective in any
event.

33 o

325. See A. DEWING, supra note 25, at 742.
326. See J.F. WEsToN, THE SCORE AND METHODOLOGY OF FINANCE 23-24 (1966).
327. Ia at 25. By 1931, five public utility holding companies were controlled by the holders of
stock worth less than one percent of the companies' total assets. . SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 128 (1982).

328. 3. SELIGMAN, supra note 327, at 127-28. 53 public utility holding companies went into
bankruptcy and 23 underwent workouts. Id
329. Ch. 687,49 Stat. 803 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 79-79z-6 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988)). The
case is rare because the twentieth-century American norm leaves corporate debt levels to management discretion, subject to intervention at insolvency. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
The law makes an exception for financial intermediaries--banks, insurance companies, and savings
and loans. The law regulates these institutions' capital structures because the institutions' creditors
are members of the public who need special protection from the dangers of risky management.
Clark, supra note 66, at 560 n.156. Nineteenth-century legal capital rules, in contrast, sometimes
imposed mandatory limits on debt. See supra text accompanying note 46.
330. 3. SELIGMAN, supra note 327, at 261. For an example of 1935 Act jurisprudence, see In re
Consumers Power Co., 6 S.E.C. 444 (1939).
Significantly, the prudent view survived the evolution to managerialist thinking tht took place
during the 1920s and 1930s. This prudent view followed from the investment conception of debt as
well as from the traditional conception. Creditors, conceived as investors, join in a common enter-
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The prudent view held sway both in textbooks and in boardrooms
for over thirty years, even as memories of the 1930s lingered. Postwar
recessions served as reminders of the continuing danger. 331 Management
followed a simple rule of thumb as it financed its growth-a dollar of
new equity for every new dollar of debt.
b. The financialeconomic critique. The pattern broke in the mid1960s.332 The theory changed radically. The practice changed slowly.
Financial economics rebuts the prudent approach's basic assumptions by using the rational economic actors of neoclassical
microeconomics and analyzing their behavior when faced with financing
and investing choices. Rational economic actors do not share managerialist investors' risk preference profile: instead, their preferences range
along an indifference curve. Breaking with the prudent investor profile,
333
some investors opt for higher risk and a higher coupon rate.
Under the irrelevance hypothesis, debt has no intrinsic value to a
firm as a financing tool. 334 Even though an optimal aggregate level of
debt may exist for the corporate sector as a whole, individual firms are
indifferent to their debt levels. 335 This theory seems to counsel equityladen capital structures; all other things being equal, why not be prudent? But in practice, all other things are not equal. Given the tax
deductibility of debt, high leverage pays.
Agency theory modified this point slightly, holding that leverage
makes sense up to the point when the risk of bankruptcy looms so large
that discounted marginal increases in bankruptcy costs exceed tax savings.336 Yet, this optimal leverage point can be rather high. Jensen and
Meckling articulated the basic agency justification for heavily leveraged
restructurings in their prescient 1976 article. Given management's tendency to shirk, debtholders' fixed claims should dominate over equityholders' interests, because debt inhibits management misconduct and
saves taxes as well.3 37 And, the authors speculated, the bankruptcy cost
barrier is not as formidable as the managerialist picture suggests. Bankprise with managers and stockholders. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. Prudence
prevails in order to protect creditors' security and promote the common enterprise; in effect, prudence becomes a component of investor protection.
331. J.F. WESTON, supra note 326, at 23.

332. Profit margins and opportunities in many industries shrank. New management methods
encouraged experimentation. Id at 30.
333. See Levmore, supra note 161, at 51.
334. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
335. Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FiN. 261, 268-69 (1977).
336. Litzenberger, supra note 141, at 66.
337. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 148, at 330-31.
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ruptcy costs are small 338 and thus not a major determinant of capital
structure.

Agency theory also removes the stigma of disgrace and failure from
bankruptcy. In the nexus-of-contracts firm, debt and equity, as financial
inputs, have fundamental similarities. Debt presents no special threat; it
is merely equity with a fixed claim and a higher priority. 339 In accord

with this approach, bankruptcy becomes a contract performance problem stemming from the debtor's cash-flow shortfall. 34° Faced with a contract performance problem, rational economic actors do not wring their
hands about failure. They sit down and work out low-cost solutions.
c. Managerialismandfinancial economics compared Managerialism and financial economics begin with different conceptions of the corporation. The managerialist corporate entity has a cognizable separate

existence. Management has the expertise that makes mass production
possible; to put that expertisb to use, management must command. The
corporate entity facilitates management action; it therefore has value and
338. Id. at 341; see supra note 160 (Warner's study);, see also Levmore, supra note 161, at 65-68
(summarizing Jensen and Mecklings model).
Jensen argues that firms that become insolvent after failed restructurings will incur lower costs
than those experienced in the past. Jensen, Is Leverage an Invitation to Bankruptcy? On the Contrary-ItKeeps Shaky Tums out of Court, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1989, at A14, col. 3. He compares an
insolvent company with an 85% debt ratio to an insolvent company with a 20% debt ratio; both
companies have the same liquidation value, 10% of going-concern value. At the time the less leveraged company becomes insolvent, "it is ... likely that its value is below its liquidation value."
Actual liquidation might follow "with all its attendant conflicts and dislocation." Id The highly
leveraged firm, in contrast, will be reorganized, probably through an out-of-court agreement in order
to protect its high going-concern value. At worst, this firm will undergo the additional costs of a
bankruptcy reorganization. Jensen adds that even in such a case, the reorganization process can
cause beneficial management changes, id at A14, col. 5, and that, because of the leadership of "organizations such as Drexel Burnham Lambert," innovative contract solutions can be expected when
restructured companies fail. See id at col. 4.
Jensen implies that we need not expect restructuring-related indebtedness to result in excessive
bankruptcy costs, provided that the government does not intervene. But Jensen's cost picture does
not provide strong support for his implication. The economics of workouts and reorganization that
Jensen describes are not new to the restructuring era. Indeed, high pessimists, guarded pessimists,
and all other observers who suggest that today's restructuring might result in significant future costs,
use a scenario much like Jensen's. The more pertinent comparison would seem to be between a firm
with 85% debt and an otherwise identical firm with a 50% to 60% debt. In an economic downturn,
the latter firm avoids the reorganization costs incurred by the more highly leveraged firm. Investors
in the more highly leveraged firm would be better off than investors in the moderately leveraged
firms only if agency-cost savings from the highly leveraged firm's restructuring outweighed its subsequent reorganization costs.
339. Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, supra note 148, at 173; see also supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
340. Lehn, Blackwell & Mar, supra note 148, at 175.
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is worth preserving.3 1 Debt is intrinsically problematic because it
threatens the entity's integrity, just as mortgage debt threatens the household of the breadwinner who signs the note. Like the household, the
managerialist firm is an institution worth protecting against outside disruption. The managerialist corporation, then, not only reified the traditional debtor-creditor relationship, but also adopted the traditional ethic
of prudence regarding debt.
Financial economics, in contrast, deconstructs the managerialist
corporate entity, reducing it to a reference point where factors of production meet and contract. Management becomes just one of the factors of
production.3 2 Debt becomes just another cluster of terms in a wider
structure of contracts. It jeopardizes nothing of value, since contracting
can deal with any performance problems. Financial economics characterizes default and bankruptcy not as terminating events, but as negotiations with determinable costs. This perspective makes debt prudence
irrational unless the costs of default are in fact very high.
Theoretically, both approaches have considerable appeal. One practical difference separates them, however: managerialist prudence has a
basis in history as well as in theory. Reorganizations during the management corporation's formative period brought home the riskiness of debt.
Agency theory, in contrast, counsels corporations to take on more debt,
relying on an insufficiently proven assertion about bankruptcy costs. No
thoroughgoing study of contemporary direct and indirect bankruptcy
costs supports this counsel. 34s Moreover, a substantial body of opinion
considers these costs significant. 3 " Given a long, complex reorganization proceeding, bankruptcy involves substantial costs beyond those apparent from a review of checks written by the treasurer of a debtor in
possession. These costs include lost sales and other income losses from
financial stress and perceptions of such stress in various markets.M5 No
one really knows whether the new debt-equity ratios will result in material costs in the event of a substantial economic downturn. Nor does
anyone know how much of this bill will fall upon society.
341. See generally Bratton, Nexus of ContractsAppraisal supra note 12 (outlining development
of managerialist conception).
342. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
343. Significantly, many institutional changes this century have reduced dislocations from bankruptcies. Under current law, reorganization not only keeps creditors at bay and the productive
entity producing, but it also keeps management on the job. See 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) (debtor in possession operates business unless court orders otherwise).
344. See, &g., R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 81, at 395; Litzenberger, supra note 141, at
61.
345. Litzenberger, supra note 141, at 61-62.
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The discussion thus comes down to the matter of risk. Although
not risk-prudent, the new debt-equity ratios are not irrational. They entail a calculated risk. But acknowledging this element of calculation does
not by itseffjustify the risks. Even risks rationally assumed can come to
pass, causing regrets in the risk-assuming actors. Furthermore, unlike
the actors of financial economics, real-world investors are not completely
rational, especially at extreme upsides and dowsides where large
amounts of wealth are staked on events at the margin. In the end, despite the assurances of financial economics, we have no guarantee that
the new debt-equity ratios will represent a healthy break with and improvement on the past, rather than a repeat of the speculative excesses of
the 1920s.
Lawmakers, meanwhile, carry on in the traditional mode, watching
impassively. The debt-equity experiment falls within the traditional zone
of business discretion. If the experiment fails, legal regulation will follow, possibly following past patterns, 3 " but certainly notwithstanding
any finance theory to the contrary.
CONCLUSION

Corporate law, like all law, exists in time. We receive it from the
past. It governs the present. It allows for the future. It synchronizes
past practices, present pressures, and future contingencies against an unfolding background of values.
At present, the great question facing corporate lawmakers is
whether, in the long run and in the aggregate, the restructuring movement will create value or inflict injury. Of course, the question cannot be
answered, since economic science falls well short of the task. We opine
and hope that value will be created. But, at the same time, we know and
fear that tomorrow's economic downturn could make us regret today's
transactions.
The law with which we structure our economic relations helps us
cope with this imperfect economic understanding. Today the law tolerates risky capital structures, but it does so without denying past disasters.
Today's risky practices have no permanent, immutable basis in right.
The law therefore holds open the possibility of future intervention
against today's transactional patterns. During the past decade, constraining policies of investor protection have yielded to the market's
securitization experience, clearing the way for restructurings. During the
next decade, today's toleration of risky transactions might likewise yield
346. See supra notes 329-30 and accompanying text for the most prominent example of past

regulation.
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to an experience of disruptive default, clearing the way for a new era of
financial regulation.
Legal tolerance of restructuring-related wealth transfers also has a
contingent aspect. The restructurings have made once basic assumptions
regarding corporate debt relationships inaccurate. This change has destabilized these relationships and destroyed their previous pattern of reciprocity. The law currently tolerates the situation for several reasons.
First, we remain comfortable with the traditional conception of debt relationships. Second, financial economics explains away the short-run injuries. Third, in the long run, these relationships might very well resolve
themselves without costly and confusing legal intervention. Finally, any
legal intervention would have to draw much of its normative impetus
from the relational value of solidarity. This value, basic to the investment conception of corporate debt, stems from and promotes mutual respect and support among the participants of each corporate enterprise.
Solidarity has been noticeably absent from contemporary financial
relationships.
Indeed, the restructuring movement presupposes diminished solidarity in economic relationships. Today's corporate tycoons take value
for their own accounts from producing institutions and others interested
in them, including bondholders. Today's commentators justify this appropriation by asserting that enforced solidarity would inhibit wealth
creation and cost-reductive reform. Legal theory's disaggregation of the
corporation into a nexus of contracts shapes and supports this pattern of
thought. 34 7
Perhaps diminished solidarity will, as the commentators suggest, facilitate this country's return to a competitive posture. Even so, the diminution need not be permanent: should the restructuring movement
achieve its apparent goal of low-cost production, a reordering of values
could follow. Consciousness also could shift without such a functional
invitation; lawmakers could find individual profit taking from productive
institutions unsatisfactory on some other new grounds. In either event,
solidarity could return as a determining value in corporate law and practice, playing a remedial role in a wider institutional reconstruction. The
investment community's insecure, questioning response to the RJR
Nabisco affair may signal a change in this direction.
Renewed solidarity in financial relationships would militate against
further toleration of wealth transfers that harm bondholders. Significantly, the law could change overnight to conform to a shift in values.
347. This, of course, marks a change from earlier patterns of thought---patterns that prevailed
when America was by far the world's most productive country.
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Judges can constrain injuries to bondholders without abandoning traditions of judicial restraint. Existing law contains the necessary tools.

